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INTRODUCTION
ESTITUTION is, among other things, a label that courts and legislatures have given to a variety of monetary remedies. Courts
have classified as "restitution" monetary remedies that give relief
for unjust enrichment, that award the plaintiff the defendant's gain rather
than the plaintiff's loss, that accompany the unwinding of a transaction,
or that restore something to the plaintiff.' In statutes, "restitution" can
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School, 1986; B.A., University of Virginia, 1983. I would like to thank Andrew Kull, David
Levine, Bill Nelson, and Emily Sherwin for their helpful comments on this project. I am
also grateful to my faculty colleagues at the Roger Williams University School of Law for
their suggestions offered during a colloquium on this article. Finally, I thank Christy Hetherington for her research assistance.
1. See infra Part III. This article addresses the use of "restitution" to connote monetary remedies available under domestic law. Under international law, restitution has been
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mean compensation for crime victims, repayment of money, the disgorge2
ment of a statutory violator's gain, or compensation for harms suffered.
The variety of ways in which courts and legislatures have used restitution to describe monetary remedies is perhaps unsurprising given that the
contours of the general law of restitution in some respects have been inexact and subject to scholarly debate. The Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts, promulgated in 1936,
has been credited with creating a coherent law of restitution from an assortment of precedents, forms of action, and remedial devices that had
developed around the principle that unjust enrichment should be disgorged. 3 Although the core idea of the original Restatement is that restitution is the substantive law of unjust enrichment, the Restatement also
uses restitution to refer to the restoration of something, apart from liability based on unjust enrichment. 4 Modern scholars have debated whether
restitution should be defined solely as the law of unjust enrichment or
whether it also includes "restoration" remedies. 5 Some have argued that
restitution should be defined as any remedy based on the defendant's
gain at the plaintiff's expense. 6 Drafts of the American Law Institute's
current endeavor to produce a Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment7 indicate that the law of unjust enrichment will be at the
core of the project, but restoration remedies also are mentioned. 8
used to mean restoration of the status quo ante. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Restitution as a
Remedy in U.S. Courts for Violations of InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 341, 343-48
(2001) (discussing possible forms of restitution under international law, including the return of property unlawfully taken, suppression of self-incriminating evidence, and the release of a wrongfully abducted person).
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, re-

porter's introductory memorandum at xv (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000) (describing the
original Restatement of Restitution as creating the field of restitution and unjust enrichment); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277,
1278 (1989) [hereinafter Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution] (describing
the Restatement of Restitution as creating the field of restitution).
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS, general scope note at 2 (1937) (labeling ejectment, replevin, and trover as restitutionary); id. ch. 7 introductory note at 523 (characterizing replevin and ejectment as restitutionary because they "restore to the possession of the owner property of which he was
deprived"). See also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1194
(1995) [hereinafter Kull, Rationalizing Restitution] (commenting that the original Restatement appears "to accept the idea that the act of restoration forms at least a subsidiary part
of the law of restitution, despite the fact that the restoration remedies ... operate without
regard to the defendant's unjust enrichment"); Laycock, The Scope and Significance of
Restitution, supra note 3, at 1279-81 (discussing how the original Restatement uses restitution to mean restoration of a specific thing).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra notes 34-41, 44 and accompanying text.
7. The first restatement of the law of restitution produced by the American Law Institute, the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI-CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS, was promulgated in 1936 and published in 1937. The ALl attempted to produce a
second Restatement in the early 1980's, but the effort was discontinued. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, foreword at ix (Discussion Draft,
Mar. 31, 2000).
8. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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Whether a court classifies a monetary remedy as restitution or something else-such as damages-can have significant consequences. For example, if the plaintiff sues for monetary relief under a statute that
authorizes restitution but not damages or compensation, the court will
need to decide whether the remedy sought can be labeled restitution. 9
Less directly, courts have used restitution to differentiate between legal
and equitable monetary relief, with consequences for whether a cause of
action under a statute exists and for whether litigants have a right to jury
trial. To illustrate, if the plaintiff sues under a federal statute that authorizes only "equitable relief," then the court's characterization of the
plaintiff's requested relief as damages or compensation-legal reliefwill mean that the plaintiff likely does not have a cause of action. 10 If the
court characterizes the remedy as restitution, then the plaintiff may have
a cause of action, depending on whether the court treats the restitution12
ary remedy as legal or equitable. 1 Under the Seventh Amendment,
which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to guarantee a right to
jury trial when a legal remedy is sought, a claim for damages will trigger a
jury right, but a claim for restitution may or may not, depending again
on
3
the legal or equitable classification of the restitutionary remedy.'
In trying to distinguish between legal and equitable remedies, courts
frequently have made two errors of classification with respect to monetary restitution. First, some courts have classified particular monetary
remedies as restitution when the remedies should have been classified as
damages. 14 Second, due to a misreading of history and precedents, some
courts have suggested that restitution is exclusively an equitable
15
remedy.
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in classifying restitution. It
has used varying definitions to distinguish restitution of money from
other monetary remedies such as compensation. It has at times suggested
that restitution is exclusively an equitable remedy, while at other times, it
has acknowledged that restitution can be legal or equitable, depending on
9. Cf Perrone v. Andry, 232 F.3d 433, 439-40 (2000) (interpreting Truth in Lending
Act and asserting that "[i]f Congress had meant for restitution to be the measure of actual
damages, it could have easily said so in the statute").
10. See infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 178-251 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part III. The first case to articulate the principle of unjust enrichment in
mid-eighteenth century England explained that even in the absence of an express or implied contract, a defendant could be under an obligation to the plaintiff such that the "equity" of the case dictated that the plaintiff have a remedy. Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng.
Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760). Restitution became available in both the law courts and the equity
courts, with "equitable" considerations-meaning concerns about fairness-driving the determination whether the defendant was liable. Modern courts have seized on the notion
that restitution is "equitable" in the dictionary sense of "fairness," but have overlooked
historical differences between restitution at law and restitution in equity. See infra Part III.
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the circumstances of the case. 16 The Supreme Court's latest foray into
classifying restitution is its 2002 decision in Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson.17 There, a divided Court assumed that the
remedy sought by the plaintiff was restitution, but it debated whether the
remedy was legal or equitable.
This article attempts to clarify the classification of monetary relief as
restitution, focusing on the area of greatest challenge-where the plain18
tiff's loss or the defendant's gain was originally monetary in form.
Through examining the scholarly literature, legislation, history, and case
law, three general claims emerge: (1) monetary restitution should be distinguished from compensation or damages, with the concept of restitution
as "restoring" a specific thing to the plaintiff generally inapplicable to a
loss of money; (2) courts should cease labeling restitution as exclusively
equitable and recognize that historically, law courts heard most restitutionary claims for money to remedy a monetary loss or gain; and (3) courts
should not use restitution to differentiate legal from equitable monetary
remedies because such usage typically is unhelpful and susceptible to
error.
In attempting to clarify the classification of monetary relief as restitution, this article does not make a choice as to which of the general definitions of restitution is the "right" one. Rather, I examine how the various
definitions would apply to monetary remedies for a plaintiff's loss or a
defendant's gain of money, and I suggest the instances in which the definitions might or might not be helpful to the classification task. Nor does
this article endeavor to solve the broad and complex question about how
to distinguish legal from equitable remedies. Instead, I detail the ways in
which restitution has been misused in the attempt to differentiate law
from equity and suggest that restitution is not the answer to solving the
law/equity divide.
Part I of the article discusses the competing scholarly definitions of restitution and examines how they might apply to the classification of a
monetary remedy for a loss or gain originally monetary in form. Part I
also canvasses the various ways in which Congress has used the term "restitution," and it makes suggestions for how to interpret "restitution"
when the meaning that Congress has ascribed to the term is unclear. Part
II discusses the development of restitution in the courts of law and courts
of equity. It then focuses on the circumstances that govern whether a
restitutionary claim for money should be considered to have historical
roots in law or equity. Part III traces the Supreme Court's classifications
of monetary remedies as restitution. These classifications have occurred
in two main categories of cases: (1) where the Court has had to determine
whether the plaintiff's requested remedy was authorized by statute; and
16. See infra Part Ill.
17. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
18. Monetary restitution also can be awarded when the defendant has benefited from
goods or services obtained from the plaintiff.
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(2) where the issue was whether the plaintiff sought legal relief triggering
a right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. This Part shows how
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts misread imprecise language
about restitution in earlier cases, resulting in the misclassification of
monetary remedies. Part III also looks at one remedy that has proven
particularly vexing-backpay-to illustrate how courts have invoked the
terminology of restitution and reached varying conclusions as to whether
a monetary remedy is damages or restitution; legal or equitable. In Part
IV, I discuss possible explanations for the confusion in the courts about
monetary restitution, including the fact that courts have misused restitution to resolve larger questions about the law/equity divide and the general equitable powers of the federal courts. I argue that restitution
should not be used in this way, for it causes needless complexity and does
not help to answer the ultimate questions involved. I also make suggestions in Part IV for how the new Restatement could help to clarify the
classification of monetary restitution.
I.

CLASSIFYING A MONETARY REMEDY AS RESTITUTION

The general law of restitution is for many an obscure subject, perhaps
explaining why so much confusion exists as to when monetary remedies
are properly characterized as restitutionary. Professor Andrew Kull, in
his capacity as reporter of the American Law Institute's current project to
produce a new Restatement, has lamented that "a substantial portion of
the American bench and bar today could not comfortably explain what
'the law of restitution' is or how it works."' 9 This lack of understanding
may be a function of the complexity of the subject 20 and the fact that
21
scholarly authorities on restitution differ over its definition and content.
My purposes in this Part are to discuss briefly the principal scholarly definitions of restitution, to evaluate how those definitions affect the specific
topic of how to characterize monetary relief, and to examine the various
ways in which Congress has used the term "restitution" to describe monetary remedies.
19.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT,

reporter's in-

troductory memorandum at xvi (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000). Kull attributes the lack

of knowledge about restitution among the American bench and bar in part to the disappearance of a course on restitution from the U.S. law school curriculum in the mid 1960s.
Id. Professor Douglas Laycock has remarked that "[i]n the mental map of most lawyers,
restitution consists largely of blank spaces with undefined borders and only scattered
patches of familiar ground." Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra
note 3, at 1277.
20. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES 316 (6th ed. 1998) ("Restitution is a complex
and unruly topic with many subdivisions and without a uniform vocabulary or a universal
No overarching principle exists from which all restitution rules may
theoretical base ....
be drawn.")
21. See
ALS

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:

569 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter

CASES AND MATERI-

LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES] ("'Restitu-

tion' and 'unjust enrichment' turn out to have multiple meanings, and we have not yet
settled on an unambiguous modern vocabulary to distinguish all those meanings.").
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THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE OVER THE TAXONOMY OF RESTITUTION

A starting point in defining restitution is the original Restatement of the
Law of Restitution. In its first section, the Restatement expresses what it
considers to be the essentials of restitution: "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution
to the other. '22 The Restatement explains that a person is "unjustly enriched" if he receives a benefit from another 23 and "the circumstances of
its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is

unjust for him to retain

'

it." 24

With respect to the remedy for unjust enrichment, the Restatement
comments that "[o]rdinarily the measure of restitution is the amount of
enrichment received." 25 In other words, the defendant's gain, rather than
the plaintiff's loss, typically is the measure of recovery in an action for
unjust enrichment. In many instances, a remedy based on the defendant's
enrichment would yield the same award as a remedy based on the plaintiff's loss. 26 In certain circumstances-typically those of conscious wrongdoing-the defendant may be required to disgorge any profits that it
derived from the benefit, and the amount of recovery for unjust enrichment may therefore exceed the plaintiff's loss. 27
Restitution as a basis of liability parallel to contract and tort has been
called "freestanding" restitution, with the substantive component being
unjust enrichment and the remedial component being restitution of the
defendant's gain.2 8 In addition to defining restitution as a freestanding
basis of liability, the Restatement sometimes employs restitution in another sense-that of restoring something to the plaintiff or restoring
29
someone to a previous condition.
In recent years, scholars have debated how to define the field of restitution. 30 The debate has centered on whether restitution should be de22. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); see also id. general scope note at 1-3.
23. The original Restatement defined "benefit" very broadly in the following comment:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of
or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs
services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty
of the other, or in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. He
confers a benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, but also
where he saves the other from expense or loss.
Id. at cmt. b.
24. Id. § I at cmt. c.
25. Id. at cmt. a. See also id. at cmts. d-e.
26. Id. at cmt. d ("Ordinarily the benefit to the one and the loss to the other are
coextensive, and the result of the remedies given under the rules stated in the Restatement
of this Subject is to compel the one to surrender the benefit which he has received and
thereby to make restitution to the other for the loss which he has suffered.").
27. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 149, topic 2, introductory note at 596
(1937). ("If [the defendant] was consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit, he is ...
deprived of any profit derived from his subsequent dealing with it.").
28. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement:
Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 886 (1999).

29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4; LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21; Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment,
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fined primarily as a substantive basis of liability or primarily as a remedy
that is distinct from the law of unjust enrichment. Professor Kull has advanced the argument that restitution should be defined solely as a substantive basis of liability, with its own characteristic remedies. 31 He has
stated that "[t]he simplest possible account of the law of restitution, consistent with the case law, will describe it as the branch of civil liability that
is based on and measured by the unjust enrichment of the defendant at
the expense of the plaintiff. '32 Kull has commented that unjust enrichment "becomes visible as the basis of liability" in two circumstances: (1)
when the defendant has not breached an independent duty to the plaintiff
based in contract or tort, or (2) when the benefit to33the defendant from
the defendant's wrong exceeds the plaintiff's losses.
Professor Peter Birks is among those who consider restitution to be
most appropriately defined as a remedy. Birks differentiates between the
"event" of unjust enrichment and the "legal response" of restitution. 34
79 TEX. L.

1767 (2001) [hereinafter Birks, Unjust Enrichment]; Peter Birks, MisnoPAST, PRESENT & FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GARETH JONES
1 (Cornish et al. eds. 1998) [hereinafter Birks, Misnomer]. Professor Birks is one of several
British scholars engaged in scholarly debate about restitution; there is active scholarship
about restitution in Canada and Australia as well. See, e.g., PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION [hereinafter BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
RESTITION] (1985); LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Gareth Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter GOFF & JONES] (an English treatise);
REV.

mer, in RESTITUTION:

PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMuS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1990) (a Canadian treatise); Justice Beverley McLachlin, Restitution in Canada, in RESTITUTION: PAST,
PRESENT & FUTURE, supra at 275; J. Beatson, Restitution in Canada: A Commentary, in
RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE, supra at 297; KEITH MASON & J.W. CARTER,
RESTITUTION LAW IN AUSTRALIA (1995).

31. There is much support for the notion that the avoidance of unjust enrichment is
the predominant aim of the law of restitution. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUSTr ENRICHMENT § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983); GEORGE PALMER, THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1 (1978); DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (2d ed. 1993). Kull has
further refined the substantive definition of restitution, describing restitution as the "law of
noncontractual transfers." Andrew Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, 11
JOURNAL OF CONTRACT LAW 93 (1997) [hereinafter Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer]. That is, restitution governs those transactions in which a "nongratuitous
benefit moves between private parties otherwise than pursuant to a valid contract." Id. at
93.
32. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1226 (emphasis added). Because
restitution is "measured by" the defendant's unjust enrichment, the remedy is based on the
defendant's gain, rather than the plaintiff's loss. The remedy for unjust enrichment can
take the form either of restitution "in specie" (giving the plaintiff the very thing that the
defendant has gained) or of monetary relief measured by the value of the defendant's gain.
Id. at 1194. See also Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at
1290 (acknowledging "monetary restitution of the value of defendant's gain" as one form
of restitutionary relief).
33. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1218 n.85. Kull adds that "where
the injury to the plaintiff from the defendant's wrongdoing equals or exceeds the benefit to
the defendant-both established usage and analytical convenience dictate that the liability
be primarily explained in terms of the harm, not the benefit." Id.
34. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 30, at 1769-72. See also James J. Edelman,
Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1869 (2001) (asserting that
"'restitution' should be a term that refers only to a particular remedy, and 'unjust enrichment' should be a phrase that describes a particular group of actionable causes, none of
which is a wrong").
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For Birks, restitution can be the legal response to any "one of a number
of distinct causative events," including unjust enrichment. 35 He asserts
that rights to restitution "arise from consent, from wrongs, from unjust
enrichments, or from various other events."' 36 Thus, for Birks, unjust enrichment is but one of several sources of liability triggering the remedy of
37
restitution.
As for how to define the "legal response of restitution," Birks describes
it as the "yielding up" of defendant's gain, 38 which can take the form
either of a "giving back" or a "giving up that is not a giving back."' 39 A
"giving back" occurs when the defendant returns something or the value
of that thing to the plaintiff; a "giving up that is not a giving back" occurs
when the defendant gives to the plaintiff something the plaintiff never
had, such as when the defendant must give up any profit that the defendant made on money or property obtained from the plaintiff.40 Courts
have acknowledged these two types of restitutionary remedies, often using the term "disgorgement of profits" to describe the situation when the
defendant is required to give the plaintiff profits that the plaintiff never
41
had.
Professor Douglas Laycock has suggested three different facets of restitution. 42 Like Kull, he defines restitution as a source of liability based on
35. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 30, at 1770.
36. Id. at 1772.
37. There perhaps is more agreement between Birks and Kull than appears from
Birks's delineation among unjust enrichment, wrongs, consent, and other events. Birks
notes that Kull characterizes "unjust enrichment" in such a way as to include many of the
"wrongs" that Birks says give rise to the remedy of restitution. Id. at 1777 (arguing that
Kull incorrectly "turns restitution for wrongs ... into a subset of unjust enrichment, which
it is not").
38. Birks, Misnomer, supra note 30, at 11. See also BIRKS, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 30, at 13 (stating that the "legal response of restitution"
consists in causing one person to give up to another an enrichment received at his expense
or its value in money).
39. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 30, at 1773.
40. Id.
41. The Discussion Draft of portions of the Restatement (Third) distinguishes between
return of a benefit that the defendant has obtained at the plaintiff's expense and disgorgement of profits that the defendant has made based on the benefit obtained, with disgorgement available only in instances of conscious wrongdoing or in cases involving trustees or
other fiduciaries. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICH-

cmt. c (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000) ("[T]here are significant instances of
liability based on unjust enrichment that do not involve the restoration of anything the
claimant previously possessed. Salient examples include cases involving the disgorgement
of profits, or other benefits wrongfully obtained, in excess of the plaintiff's loss."); id. § 2
cmt. d ("Restitution in a proper case may strip a defendant of all profits gained in a transMENT § 1,

action with the plaintiff ....

Such a result is permissible only against a defendant whom

the law treats as a conscious wrongdoer."); id. § 3 cmt. c ("Liability to disgorge profits is
ordinarily limited to instances of conscious wrongdoing ....

As an exception to this gen-

eral rule, trustees and other fiduciaries may be made liable for profits realized even as the
result of an unintentional breach of fiduciary duty.")
42. Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3. Birks credits
Laycock with "being the first to denounce the notion that restitution was triggered by a
single causative event which could usefully be called unjust enrichment." Birks, Unjust
Enrichment, supra note 30, at 1771.
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defendant's unjust enrichment. 43 Like Birks, he suggests that restitution
is a measure of recovery based on the defendant's gain, regardless of the
source of liability.44 Laycock adds to the definition of restitution the con46
cept of "specific restitution," 45 a term used by the original Restatement.
Laycock defines the term to include remedies that "restore to the plaintiff
the specific thing he lost" or that "undo disrupted transactions and restore both parties to their original positions in kind."'47 As examples of
restitutionary remedies that "grant specific restitution of the thing itself,"
Laycock cites rescission of a contract, constructive trust, replevin, and
ejectment. 48 Kull has disputed Laycock's linkage of the "restoration"
remedies with restitution, in part because restoration remedies are not
unique to liability based on unjust enrichment; they are available as well
49
for liability based on contract and tort.
With their common emphasis on defendant's gain as the measure of
restitutionary recovery, all three scholars would agree that "restitution"
must be distinguished from "compensation," a remedy measured by the
plaintiff's loss. 50 Moreover, Laycock and other American scholars have
43. Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1284-85 (stating that "[d]efendant may be unjustly enriched without having committed any other civil
wrong" and that "[w]henever liability depends on a finding of unjust enrichment, the law
of restitution is substantive as distinguished from remedial").
44. See id. at 1285-88 (discussing restitution as a remedy based on defendant's gain and
stating that in cases for tort or breach of contract, "[d]efendant's enrichment is now generally recognized as simply an alternate measure of recovery" to plaintiff's loss); LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 578 ("It therefore seems to me much
simpler and more straightforward to say,., that in cases like Olwell and Bank One, quasicontract is simply a remedy for tort. Instead of suing for her own losses from the conversion or fraud, plaintiff sues for defendant's gains from the conversion or fraud.")
45. For Laycock, specific restitution is "part of the core concept of restitution ...
conceptually equal to the avoidance of unjust enrichment." Laycock, Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1280.
46. Laycock notes that the Restatement uses restitution in the literal sense of restoring
something to the plaintiff, even though its emphasis is on restitution as the law of unjust
enrichment. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 4 cmts. c, d (1937); id. § 128).
47. As examples of specific restitution of the "thing itself," Laycock cites constructive
trust, rescission, replevin, and ejectment. Id. at 1290. Laycock further states that the "equitable lien is a hybrid, granting a money judgment and securing its collection with a lien
on the specific thing." Id.
48. Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1290.
49. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1212-22. Kull argues that the "logical connection" between unjust enrichment and restoration is "no greater than that between restoration and liability for breach of contract, or between restoration and liability
for tort." Id. at 1214-15.
50. See, e.g., Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1283
("Restitution must be distinguished from compensation, either by its focus on restoration
of the loss in kind or by its focus on defendant's gain as the measure of recovery.") (footnote omitted); Birks, Misnomer, supra note 30, at 11-12 ("It is essential not to use 'restitution' to denote any kind of 'compensation'. 'Restitution' must be kept for the yielding up
of gains, 'compensation' for the making good of loss, however the loss is measured."); cf.
Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1193 ("Whenever the law gives a remedy
measured by the defendant's gain rather than plaintiff's loss, a duty to disgorge unjust
enrichment will explain the defendant's liability more readily ...than will a duty merely to
refrain from injuring others."). Laycock's conception of restitution as restoration of a loss
"in kind" leads to difficulties in distinguishing damages from restitution when the loss was
originally monetary. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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urged that "restitution" and "damages" should be treated as alternate
measures of recovery. 51 For these scholars, the term "damages" has a
narrower meaning than monetary relief in general and should be limited
to recovery based on plaintiff's loss or recovery of punitive damages. By
contrast, Birks and other British scholars write of "restitutionary damages" and "disgorgement damages," with the term "damages" seeming to
have the meaning of monetary relief generally. 52 For purposes of discussing U.S. cases and statutes, this article assumes a strict division between
restitution and damages, with "damages" read narrowly to mean measures of the plaintiff's loss or, when applicable, punitive damages.
Against the backdrop of the debate among Kull, Laycock, and Birks
over the taxonomy of restitution, the American Law Institute is moving
forward with its project to restate anew the law of restitution. With Kull
as the reporter, and Laycock as an adviser, some draft portions of the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment have been circulated: a "Discussion Draft" dated March 31, 2000 that, among other
things, introduces the project and contains a chapter on "General Principles"; and two "Tentative Drafts" that contain sections on liability in restitution. 53 These drafts provide a sense of the current direction of the
project, although they are subject to revision until the Restatement
(Third) is completed and fully approved by the ALI.
Of immediate note is how the title of the proposed Restatement (Third)
describes the project: "Restitution and Unjust Enrichment." Explaining
the choice of title, the Director of the ALI has written:
In Restatement Third we are restoring the full title, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, that appeared on the Tentative Drafts of the
original Restatement but that was dropped when the official text was
published. In so doing we are emphasizing that the subject matter
encompasses an independent and coherent body of law, the 54law of
unjust enrichment, and not simply the remedy of restitution.
51. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 617 ("It
would surely be better to confine the word damages to measures of plaintiff's loss, and to
settled usage concerning punitive damages, and to use restitution to describe recovery of
defendant's profits. Restitution is not an alternate measure of damages; rather, restitution
and damages are alternate measures of monetary recovery."); Rendleman, supra note 28,
at 893 ("In the technical language of remedies, 'damages' means money a claimant recovers to compensate loss, while 'restitution' means claimant's recovery, taken from the defendant to prevent its unjust enrichment. Damages sufficient to provide restitution is
technically an oxymoron because courts measure 'damages' to compensate plaintiffs and
'restitution' to strip defendants of unjust enrichment.").
52. Birks, Misnomer, supra note 30, at 13 (discussing the usage of "restitutionary damages" and "restitution for wrongs"); Edelman, supra note 34, at 1870 (referring to "restitutionary damages" and "disgorgement damages").
53. Specifically, the Discussion Draft of 2000 has chapters on general priniciples and
transfers subject to avoidance; Tentative Draft No. 1, dated April 6, 2001, revises some of
the chapter on transfers subject to avoidance; and Tentative Draft No. 2, dated April 1,
2002, contains further revisions to the chapter on transfers subject to avoidance and a
chapter on intentional transactions.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, foreword at
ix (written by Lance Liebman, Director, The American Law Institute) (Discussion Draft,
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Birks has characterized the title as an "equivocation" that "will not resolve the tensions created in the [original Restatement] by a failure to
analyze the relation between unjust enrichment, an event, and restitution,
'55
a legal response.
The clear emphasis of the Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third)
is that the law of restitution is the law of unjust enrichment. Section 1 of
the "General Principles" part of the draft, titled "Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment," closely follows section 1 of the original Restatement. It
states: "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
liable in restitution to the other."'56 Section 4 of the General Principles,
titled "Remedies," states in part that "[t]he function of remedies in restitution is to prevent or redress the unjust enrichment of one or more persons at the expense of the plaintiff. ' 57 These principles, as well as
tie the remedy of restitution to liability
commentary to the principles,
58
based on unjust enrichment.
Nonetheless, the Discussion Draft has some ambiguous language on
whether the law of restitution also includes the restoration of something,
regardless of the basis of liability. For example, the draft asserts that
"most of what is covered by the law of restitution might more helpfully be
called the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment, '59 while acknowledging that:
[T]here are numerous situations in which a claimant's undoubted
right to the restitution (or restoration) of something does not depend
Mar. 31, 2000). The Discussion Draft elsewhere contains further explanation of the title.
See id. § 1 cmt. a.
55. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 30, at 1769.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 at 1 (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000).
57. Id. § 4.
58. For example, in a comment to § 1, the Discussion Draft states:
[An] important misconception is that restitution is essentially a remedy,
available in certain circumstances to enforce obligations derived from torts,
contracts, and other topics of substantive law. On the contrary, restitution
(meaning the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment) is itself a source of
obligations, analogous in this respect to tort or contract. A liability in restitution is enforced by restitution's own characteristic remedies, just as a liability
in contract is enforced by what we think of as contract remedies.
Id. § 1 cmt. h.
59. Id. § 1 cmt. c at 7 (emphasis added). The Discussion Draft explains its use of the
term "unjustified enrichment:"
The concern of restitution is not, in fact, with unjust enrichment [in the broad
sense of inequitable results], but with the narrower set of circumstances giving rise to what is more appropriately called unjustified enrichment.... Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis: it
results from a transfer that the law treats as ineffective to work a conclusive
alteration in ownership rights. Because the legal basis that makes a transfer
effective is ordinarily a consensual exchange, a valid gift, or a legal duty
(such as a liability in tort or an obligation to pay taxes), the concern of restitution is predictably with those anomalous transfers that cannot be justified
by the terms of a valid and enforceable exchange transaction; by the intention of the transferor to make a gift; or by the existence of a legal duty to the
transferee.
Id. § 1 cmt. b at 3.
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on the unjust enrichment of the defendant .... There are, moreover,
many other legal relations in which an owner's entitlement to the
restoration of property might theoretically be explained in terms of
the defendant's
unjust enrichment but which, by convention, are not
60
so classified.
It remains to be seen whether and how the new Restatement (Third) will
treat restitution as a remedy apart from liability based on unjust enrichment. The "Projected Overall Table of Contents" in the Discussion Draft
contains sections on "Rescission" and "Specific Restitution. ' 61 It will be
interesting to note how the Restatement (Third) will handle these sections-i.e., whether these remedies will be discussed only as related to
liability based on unjust enrichment or whether the remedies will be dis62
cussed more broadly.
With respect to the distinction between restitution of a defendant's
gain and damages for a plaintiff's loss, some language in the draft portions of the Restatement (Third) is confusing. Although the drafts at
times do differentiate between compensation for plaintiff's loss and restitution of defendant's gain, 63 other portions of the drafts use the term
"compensation" to describe the remedy for unjust enrichment. 64 Rather
60. Id. § 1 cmt. c at 6-7.
61. Id. § xxii.
62. With respect to rescission, Kull has indicated an intent to tie the remedy to liability
based on unjust enrichment. In a footnote to the heading of "rescission" in the Proposed
Overall Table of Contents, the Discussion Draft states that the focus of the section will "be
on the aspects of 'law of rescission' that reflect restitutionary principles as opposed to contract: e.g., treating the requirement of restoration by plaintiff, and the two-way accounting
for interim use or profits; but not the consequences of affirmance or ratification." Id. at
xxii n.4.
63. See, e.g., id. § 4, cmt. ("Remedies in restitution are directed at gain, not loss: their
object is to eliminate the defendant's unjust enrichment, rather than to compensate the
plaintiff's injury."); id. § 1 cmt. h (discussing why criminal restitution is not part of the law
of restitution as defined by the Restatement and stating: "It is a natural use of the language
to speak of "requiring a criminal to make restitution;" the problem is that the liability
imposed in such cases is not based primarily on unjust enrichment, but on compensation
for harm."); id. § 3, reporter's note (stating that "in the circumstances of a profitable tortwhere the benefit realized by the defendant exceeds the injury to the plaintiff-the plaintiff may elect to pursue a claim in restitution to recover the amount of the defendant's
unjustified enrichment, rather than a claim in tort to recover compensation for harm.")
64. See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. d at 8-9 (stating that some intentional transfers of benefits
"give rise to a claim for compensation, while others do not: restitution is the body of law
that draws the distinction," but using the terminology of restitution, not compensation in
the illustrations to this statement); id. § 2 cmt. a (characterizing as one of "the limiting
principles that circumscribe the restitutionary liability for benefits received ... that there
exists a wide range of benefits, including many that have been created or obtained at another person's expense, that we remain free to enjoy without compensation"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, topic 2 introductory note
(Tentative Draft No. 2, April 1,2002) (writing of "the general topic of compensation for
unrequested intervention" in the law of restitution and unjust enrichment). Other portions
of the drafts use the terminology of compensation of plaintiff's loss to indicate how the
amount of restitution will be measured. See, e.g., id. § 25 cmt. f (mentioning that "the
restitutionary liability of an innocent defendant will not exceed the amount required to
compensate the claimant"); cf. id.§ 20 cmt. c (explaining that the "measure of benefit to
the recipient" of emergency services to protect life or health "is the reasonable and customary charge for such services"). This usage of compensation as a cap on the amount of
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than use "compensation," the Restatement (Third) should substitute "restitution" or generic terms such as "relief," "remedy," or "payment"
whenever it refers to a remedy for unjust enrichment. This would avoid
reader misunderstanding about the distinction between compensation
and restitution.
From this survey of the taxonomy of restitution apparent in the original
Restatement, the modern scholarly debate, and the ongoing project to
produce a new Restatement (Third), we see a consensus for the following
proposition: if liability is based on unjust enrichment, and the remedy is
measured by the defendant's gain rather than the plaintiff's loss, then the
remedy is appropriately called restitution. 65 The more difficult question
is whether and when a remedy should be called restitution apart from
liability based on unjust enrichment.

B.

THE DEBATE APPLIED TO CLASSIFYING MONETARY REMEDIES

Having surveyed the various scholarly definitions of restitution, I now
address how these definitions would apply when the plaintiff seeks a
monetary remedy for a loss or gain originally of money. Beginning with a
definition of restitution as liability based on and measured by unjust enrichment, the characterization of a monetary remedy would depend on
the grounds for liability. If the substantive law of unjust enrichment constitutes the sole basis of liability, then the monetary remedy would be for
restitution, not damages. This would be the case regardless whether the
defendant's gain is equal to, greater than, or less than, the plaintiff's
loss. 66 If the plaintiff has more than one legitimate theory of recovery,
such as unjust enrichment and contract or unjust enrichment and tort,
then the remedy would be for restitution rather than damages if the
plaintiff is entitled to a defendant gain that is greater than the plaintiff's
loss. 67 Only liability based on unjust enrichment would support such
recovery.
If the plaintiff has overlapping causes of action and the plaintiff's loss
and the defendant's gain are equal, then the characterization of the monetary remedy becomes more complex. One approach might be to choose
recovery is not problematic as long as it is understood that the remedy in its technical sense
is for restitution, not compensation.
65. Birks, who does not believe that unjust enrichment is a prerequisite for the legal
response of restitution, seemingly would agree that a claim of unjust enrichment with the
remedy measured by the defendant's gain rather than the plaintiff's loss would mean that
the remedy should be called "restitution" because this meets his definition of restitution as
the yielding up of the defendant's gain.
66. A plaintiff might claim restitution for a defendant's gain that is less than the plaintiff's loss when unjust enrichment and another legal theory such as tort might apply, but
statutes of limitations or procedural rules foreclose assertion of the other legal theory,
leaving only a restitution claim. See, e.g., Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744, 747-48 (9th Cir.
1929) (involving a defendant's decision to counterclaim for restitution because applicable
procedural rules did not permit the defendant to assert a counterclaim based on tort; recovery in restitution was possibly less than recovery in tort).
67. Whether the defendant appears to have made a gain greater than the plaintiff's
loss may be indicated at the time of pleading or as the result of discovery.
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which is the predominant basis of liability and classify the remedy accordingly. For example, defendant steals money and plaintiff sues to recover
the amount stolen. The plaintiff's theory of liability could either be the
tort of conversion or unjust enrichment. The amount the plaintiff would
recover if successful is the same, although under the tort theory, the recovery would be called damages, and under the unjust enrichment theory,
the recovery would be called restitution. The predominant theory of liability arguably is tort in that tort is the more familiar and usual way to
describe the situation of theft; the unjust enrichment theory seems secondary.68 If tort is deemed the predominant theory, the remedy would be
classified as damages.
Another approach to classifying a remedy when the plaintiff has more
than one theory of recovery and the plaintiff's loss and the defendant's
gain are equal is to assume that the theories of liability have equal explanatory value. The choice of classification then must be guided by the
purposes for which the classification is necessary. For example, assume
that a statute of limitations has a longer period in which to commence suit
for contract actions than tort actions. Assume also that the jurisdiction
treats restitution claims as contract for purposes of the statute of limitations.6 9 Returning to the theft situation, the plaintiff who has missed the
deadline for a tort claim will want the court to treat its claim as restitution. If the court treats the two theories of liability as having equal
weight, then the court's choice of how to classify the action will depend
on whether the court believes that the plaintiff should be able to make a
strategic election between two possible characterizations of the same
cause of action in order to take advantage of the longer limitations
period.
Thus, a definition of restitution as liability based on and measured by
unjust enrichment would give some answers to how to classify a monetary
remedy for a loss or gain originally of money. A monetary remedy would
be uniquely restitution in the following situations: (1) when the only possible basis of liability is unjust enrichment, or (2) when multiple theories
of liability may apply, but the plaintiff seeks a defendant gain that is
greater than the plaintiff's loss. The definition does not itself, however,
make evident how to classify a monetary remedy when plaintiff's loss and

68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. g
(Discussion Draft Mar. 31, 2000) (stating that "[t]here are instances in which a liability that
might theoretically be ascribed to restitution merely duplicates a liability that is conventionally explained in other terms" and giving theft as an example).
69. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 149 at 593 (1937) ("Ordinarily, the statutory
period for a quasi-contractual cause of action is the same as for a cause of action based
upon an oral contract."); 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 2.3 at 63 ("The limitation period for a
tort action is commonly shorter than for an action based on a contract. Most courts have
held that, through the use of quasi contract to recover benefits obtained by a tortfeasor,
the injured party can obtain the advantage of the longer limitation period; that is, the
action will be treated as contractual for purposes of the statute of limitations.") (footnote
omitted).
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defendant's gain are equal and unjust enrichment is but one possible basis
of liability.
A definition of restitution as the yielding up of the defendant's gain at
the plaintiff's expense, regardless of the basis of liability, is helpful in classifying a monetary remedy as uniquely restitution in only one situation:
when the plaintiff seeks a defendant's gain that exceeds the plaintiff's
loss. In situations of a plaintiff's loss of money equal to the defendant's
gain of money, the remedy can be characterized as either damages or
restitution. Any necessary choice as to how to classify the remedy would
depend on why the classification must be made and related
considerations.
Let us turn now to how the concept of "specific restitution" would apply to a plaintiff's loss or defendant's gain of money. Recall that Laycock
has used "specific restitution" to include two types of remedies that restore "in kind": those that "undo disrupted transactions and restore both
parties to their original positions in' 70kind" and those that restore to the
plaintiff the "specific thing he lost."
Laycock offers as the prime example of the first type of remedy the
"rescission of a partly or wholly performed transaction," in which each
party is restored "all that he has given."'7 1 In the new edition of his remedies casebook, Laycock appears to have backed away from his earlier
description of rescission as specific restitution, acknowledging that if reversing the transaction "in kind" is not feasible, the parties will be required to "pay the market value of the benefit received."'72 That is,
rescission does not necessarily result in the parties being returned "to
their original positions in kind" and thus does not perfectly correlate to
the notion of specific restitution. The Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third) devotes separate sections to "Rescission" and "Specific Restitution" in the Projected Overall Table of Contents. 73 From this
separation, one might infer that the intent is to give "specific restitution"
a meaning of restoring specific property to the plaintiff and to give "rescission" the meaning of unwinding a transaction. 74 For purposes of examining the classification of monetary remedies, I will separately
consider rescission and the restoration of a specific thing to the plaintiff.
With rescission, each party must give up the gains it obtained under a
70. Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1290. See
supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
71. Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1282.
72. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 628.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT at xxii (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000). The Discussion Draft elsewhere speaks of "rescission and
specific restitution." Id. § 4 cmt. at 27 (stating that under the heading of "proprietary
rights" in restitution is "an order restoring plaintiff to possession of his own property (as in
cases of rescission and specific restitution)").
74. The Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third), in a footnote to the "Rescission"
section in the Projected Overall Table of Contents, mentions that the section will treat "the
two-way accounting for interim use or profits," which may result in a remedy that gives the
parties more than the "specific thing" they gave under the transaction. Id. at xxii n.4 (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000).
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transaction, a giving up that has commonly been called "restitution. '75
This use of "restitution" to describe the parties' mutual return of that
which was obtained under a cancelled transaction is well established. Using restitution in this way, to include even the return of money, 76 should
not cause confusion with damages. A restitution remedy flows from the
cancellation or rescission of the transaction; a damages remedy flows
from enforcement of the transaction. What should be avoided, however,
is calling rescission "specific restitution."
The other component of specific restitution identified by Laycockrestoring something to the plaintiff in kind-has the potential to confuse
restitution with damages when applied to a loss of money.7 7 An emphasis
on restoring something to the plaintiff leads to confusion about the difference between restitution and damages, because the main purpose of compensatory damages is also the "restoration" of the plaintiff to its rightful
position. 78 We could avoid a lot of semantic confusion if we differentiated between monetary remedies for plaintiff's loss and monetary remedies for defendant's gain, with only the latter being considered
"restitution." This is not to deny the possibility of a monetary award be75. See Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1219-20 (discussing the terminology of "rescission and restitution," with "restitution ... merely a description of the end
result" of returning benefits conferred under the transaction); LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 623 ("Rescission cancels the transaction and reverses all
benefits that have been exchanged pursuant to the transaction ..... The remedy is sometimes called rescission and restitution, to emphasize the fact that neither side can rescind
without restoring what it received from the other side."); Birks treats rescission as restitution because it constitutes the "yielding up of benefits" that were transferred under a contract or other consent-based act, such as a conveyance. Birks, Misnomer, supra note 30, at
20.
76. Laycock cites as an example of the return of money the cancellation of a sale of
defective goods, by which the buyer gets "a full refund of the price-restitution of the sum
of money-in exchange for his returning the goods."

LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN

supra note 21, at 6. The buyer's other options are to seek "damages, measured
by the difference between the value of the goods as promised and the value of the goods as
delivered" or specific performance that, "if it is available, will give the buyer goods that
fully conform to the contract." Id.
77. In advancing a definition of restitution as including the restoration in kind of the
plaintiff's loss, Laycock has sought to distinguish compensation. He has differentiated restoration in kind of the plaintiff's loss from restoration of the value of the plaintiff's loss,
stating:
[R]estitution of the value of what plaintiff lost is simply compensatory damages. Used in this sense, "restitution" loses all utility as a means of distinguishing one body of law from another. Restitution must be distinguished
from compensation, either by its focus on restoration of the loss in kind or by
its focus on defendant's gain as the measure of recovery.
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1282-83 (footnote
omitted).
78. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 15 (writing
that "the essence of compensatory damages" is "to restore the injured party as nearly as
possible to the position he would have been in but for the wrong"); cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995) (stating in an employment discrimination
case that "[t]he object of compensation is to restore the employee to the position he or she
would have been in absent the discrimination"); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D. Mass. 1989) ("Were the Court to accept the argument
that a monetary award is restitutionary simply because it returns a party to pre-injury status, little would be left in the realm of compensatory damages.").
REMEDIES,
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ing classified as "specific relief. '79 Rather, it is to acknowledge that both
plaintiff's losses and defendant's gains can be remedied with either specific or substitutionary relief. We should not call a plaintiff's monetary
remedy for a loss originally of money "restitution" merely because the
remedy may be considered "specific."

By excluding the concept of specific restitution of the loss of money, we
could avoid some of the careless court language that sweeps monetary
remedies under the "restitution" rubric simply because the remedy "re-

stored" or "returned" money to the plaintiff.80 Moreover, little would be
lost if the concept of specific restitution, whatever its contours, does not
apply to the loss of money. Laycock states that a plaintiff may want restored "the specific thing he lost" for one of three reasons: because defendant is insolvent, because the thing the plaintiff lost has changed in value,

or because plaintiff values the thing he lost for nonmarket reasons.8 1 If a
plaintiff's loss was originally monetary in form, the third of the reasons
for preferring specific restitution would not apply. Nonmarket reasons,
79. In Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879 (1988), the Supreme Court distinguished between
specific monetary relief and substitutionary monetary relief for purposes of interpreting
section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Act waives sovereign immunity in
actions against federal agencies as long as the plaintiff seeks "relief other than money damages." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). The Court found that section 702 invokes a distinction between "damages" (which the Court defined as "substitutionary" relief that affords the
plaintiff compensation) and "specific remedies" which "are not substituted remedies at all,
but attempt to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled." Id. at 895 (quoting Md. Dept. of Human Res. v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1446
(D.C. Cir. 1985)) (internal citations omitted). The Court in Bowen concluded that the
monetary relief sought in the case-reimbursement from the federal government of expenditures made by Massachusetts under the Medicaid program-constituted a specific
remedy. By contrast, in Dept. of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255 (1999), the
Supreme Court held that an equitable lien sought by the plaintiff was not specific relief but
rather constituted "money damages" within the meaning of section 702. The contours of
the distinction between specific and substitutionary monetary relief need to be analyzed,
but such a task is beyond the scope of the present article. Cf DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE] (discussing differences between substitutionary and specific remedies).
80. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1995) (classifying
backpay as restitution because it "operates to restore to the plaintiff that to which she
would have enjoyed but for the employer's illegal retaliation"); Babich v. Unisys, No. 921473-MLB, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4744, at *24-36 (D. Kan. 1994) (asserting that if plaintiff
were awarded benefits due him under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), the award "would not serve
to compensate plaintiff for a harm inflicted on him" by the defendant but would "simply
restore plaintiff to his rightful position-the essence of restitution") (citation omitted); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, 819 F. Supp. 1296, 1309 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing a definition of
restitution as "restor[ing] the status quo" and holding that "[r]eceipt of withheld benefits
constitutes relief that is restitutionary"); United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, 653 F.
Supp. 984, 1007, n.2 (D.S.C. 1985) (stating that the relief requested under CERCLA was
not damages but "equitable restitution-a remedy designed to return plaintiffs to the financial position they were in before incurring cleanup costs"); United States v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., No. 4-80-469, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15986, at *10-13 (D. Minn. 1983)
(classifying the remedy requested under CERCLA as restitution, not damages, because
"the monetary relief requested by the government is only that amount necessary to compensate it for amounts expended ... in other words, the amount necessary to return the
United States to the status quo ante"). See infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
81. Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1294.
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such as sentiment, explain why a plaintiff would want a family heirloom
back. But with money being fungible (with the exception of a rare coin
or bill), there is no reason why a plaintiff would want specific currency
82
back.
As for the plaintiff wanting the specific thing that has been lost because
it has changed in value, this may apply to personal or real property, but it
does not apply to money. The money lost will not itself have changed in
value. If the defendant who has wrongfully taken plaintiff's money (say
$10) invests it for a return of $100, the plaintiff will want the $100, but this
requested remedy would not be for specific restitution-the "restoration
of the loss in kind." As Professor Kull has said in a slightly different
context, "the remedy is hardly specific restitution; on the contrary, the
plaintiff recovers property worth ten times what he lost."'8 3 Any right to
obtain the $100 could be explained more easily by other definitions of
restitution. Restitution defined as liability based on and measured by unjust enrichment would explain the plaintiff's right to obtain the $100-the
defendant should not be able to profit from conscious wrongdoing at the
plaintiff's expense.8 4 Alternatively, the plaintiff's entitlement to the $100
can be explained as the remedy of "giving up" the defendant's gain obtained at the plaintiff's expense.
The ability of a plaintiff under certain circumstances to reach a specific
fund held by an insolvent defendant can be explained on grounds other
than specific restitution. When the plaintiff can identify as hers a specific
fund of money held by the insolvent defendant, and the defendant obtained the fund through mistake, fraud, or misappropriation, courts will
impose a constructive trust or equitable lien.8 5 The plaintiff gets the fund
82.

Cf.RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §

9 cmt. f,

illus. 16 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 6, 2001) (illustrating the right to recover a rare coin
given in mistaken payment).
83.

Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1217 (asserting that if a defendant

embezzles $10 and buys property worth $100, the plaintiff is able to obtain the property
because liability is based on unjust enrichment, not because the remedy is specific
restitution).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 3 (Discussion Draft Mar. 31, 2002); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 3 (1937); see also Kull,
Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 4, at 1217 ("[T]racing allows a plaintiff to follow misappropriated property into its appreciated product. If the plaintiff can prove that $10 embezzled from him was used by defendant to buy property now worth $100, plaintiff has a
claim to the property. Restitution concludes that the defendant has been unjustly enriched
in the amount of $100, not $10.").
85. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1,11 (1924) (explaining that defrauded
claimants-had they been able to trace their funds through the debtor's bank accountscould have "asserted possession" of the funds "without violating any statutory rule against
preference in bankruptcy, because then they would have been endeavoring to get their
own money, and not money in the estate of the bankrupt"); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Unicom
Computer Corp., 13 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff entitled to mistaken payment to
debtor); City Nat'l Bank v. Gen. Coffee Corp., 828 F.2d 699 (11th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff
entitled to property obtained by debtor's fraud). The mere fact that a plaintiff can trace his
property to a fund held by an insolvent defendant is not by itself enough to trigger a right
to recover the fund as against rival creditors. Circumstances such as fraud, misappropriation, or mistake must justify the imposition of a constructive trust; otherwise, the plaintiff
simply has a debt claim like other creditors. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160
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back, and thus is given preference over rival creditors. 86 Kull characterizes the imposition of a constructive trust in these circumstances as a way
to avoid the unjust enrichment of rival creditors-"creditors should not
be looking to the fruits of the debtor's fraud for satisfaction of their
claims."'87 Describing the insolvency situation as an example of specific
restitution of money-when unjust enrichment affords an adequate explanation-comes at the expense of clarity about the distinction between
restitution and damages.
No definition of restitution answers all questions about how to classify
a monetary remedy for a loss or gain of money. What is apparent, however, is that the concept of specific restitution does not get us very far in
classifying a monetary remedy and indeed leads to confusion about restitution and damages. When describing a plaintiff's loss of money, it would
be best to avoid the terminology of specific restitution.
C.

STATUTES USING THE TERM "RESTITUTION"

Congress has used the term "restitution" in several statutes, sometimes
defining in the statute what it means by the term. In the criminal context,
Congress has used restitution to describe the money that an offender may
be ordered to pay a crime victim, which may cover the amount of the
cmt. f, at 646-47 (1937) ("[I]f money is paid under circumstances that a debt arises but not a
constructive trust, the payor cannot maintain a bill in equity for the specific recovery of the
money, even though it remains in specie in the hands of the payee and even though the

payee is insolvent.");

LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES,

supra note 21, at 669

("Victims of fraud, misappropriation, or mistake get no preference if they cannot identify
their property; ordinary creditors get no preference even if they can identify what they
loaned or its proceeds); In re N. Am. Coin & Currency, 767 F.2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding that constructive trust should not be imposed on specific fund held by insolvent
defendant because plaintiff did not establish fraud). For further discussion of the constructive trust and equitable lien, see infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
86. See Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297,
297-98 (writing that "if the state court would impose a constructive trust on certain property in an action between the claimant and the debtor, the bankruptcy court treats the
claimant as the equitable owner of the property and allows her to recover it in bankruptcy,
to the exclusion of other creditors"). Some scholars have suggested that there should be
limits to the priority that a plaintiff seeking restitution of specific property should have
over other creditors of an insolvent defendant. See id. at 329-65; Andrew Kull, Restitution
in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 283-85 (1998)
(writing that the "real teaching ... of the great case of Cunningham v. Brown" is that a
defrauded investor who can identify as his specific property held by the bankrupt debtor
should not have priority over other defrauded investors); see also LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 699 (stating that "[t]here have been repeated efforts to stamp out equitable liens that undermine the [bankruptcy] filing system"); U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000) (appearing to invalidate equitable liens that
are substitutes for bungled security transactions without invalidating equitable liens or constructive trusts in other contexts).
87. Kull, RationalizingRestitution, supra note 4, at 1217-19 (suggesting that in a case of
defendant insolvency, the real dispute is between the restitution claimant and the other
creditors and that allowing the plaintiff to recover specific property held by the defendant
"can be understood as a rule of thumb for resolving certain intractable problems of but-for
causation bearing on the question of unjust enrichment").
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victim's medical expenses, lost income, and other pecuniary losses. 88 In
the civil context-the focus of this article-Congress has employed the
term restitution in many different ways.
In several statutes, the term "restitution" is used in the same sequence
as "reimbursement," "refund," or "repayment." A few of these "repayment" statutes link restitution with a showing of unjust enrichment as a

result of a violation of the statute;8 9 most do not require a demonstration
of unjust enrichment. 90 Some statutes authorize restitution without also
using terms such as repay or refund, but surrounding language in the statute suggests that restitution means paying back. 9 '
Congress has at times authorized restitution along with damages and
88. See, e.g., Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(a)-(b) (West 2000
& Supp. 2002) (providing that a court may order a defendant convicted under specified
federal statutes to "make restitution" to victims or victims' estates, which can include
money for the value of property damaged, lost, or destroyed; medical expenses; funeral
and related services, lost income; and child care, transportation, and other expenses related
to participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense). Moreover, Congress has provided that in lieu of money, the
victim or the victim' estate may consent to "restitution of services" or "restitution to a
person or organization designated by the victim or the estate." Id. at § 3663(b)(5). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 1 cmt. h (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2002) (stating that "it is a natural use of the language to speak of
'requiring a criminal to make restitution,' but adding that this usage "is not part of the law
of restitution as defined by this Restatement").
89. In several statutes covering banks and banking, Congress has linked restitution
with unjust enrichment, providing that a person or entity may be required to "make restitution or provide reimbursement, indemnification, or guarantee against loss if [the entity
or person] was unjustly enriched in connection" with a violation of law or had violated law
with "reckless disregard." See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818, 4631 (2000).
90. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3727(e)(1) (2000) (providing that in certain assignments of
claims against the United States Government, the assignee "does not have to make restitution of, refund, or repay the amount received because of the liability of the assignor to the
Government that arises from or is independent of the contract"); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2000)
(negating liability of assignee of a public contract to "make restitution, refund, or repayment to the United States" because of assignor's liability); 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (2000) (authorizing Secretary of Health and Human Services "to make a payment to [certain social
security beneficiaries] in the nature of restitution for amounts paid by such beneficiary to
such physician which was determined to be an excess charge" under provisions of the statute); 15 U.S.C. § 3414 (2000) (authorizing "refund or restitution" in certain enforcement
actions under natural gas statutes).
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2000) (providing for specified violations of the Social
Security Act that if "such violation incudes a willful misuse of funds by the person or
entity, the court may also require that full or partial resitution of such funds be made"); 42
U.S.C. § 1007 (2000) ("In any case where the negligent failure of the Commissioner of
Social Secuirty to investigate or monitor a representative payee results in misuse of benefits by the representative payee, the Commissioner of Social Security shall make payment
to the qualified individual ... of an amount equal to the misused benefits [and] shall make
a good faith effort to obtain restitution from the terminated representative payee."); 42
U.S.C.§ 1383(a)(E), (G) (2000) (same); 28 U.S.C.A. § 613(b)(2) (West 2002) (providing in
statute governing the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts that: "A certifying officer
shall be required to make restitution to the United States for the amount of any illegal,
improper, or incorrect payment resulting froma ny false, inaccurate, or misleading certificates made by the certifying officer ....
");16 U.S.C. § 2906 (2000) (providing in statute on
fish and wildlife conservation that if "any State has received reimbursement ... for which it
is not eligible.., the State shall thereafter be ineligible to receive reimbursement.., until
restitution satisfactory to the Secretary is made").
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other remedies. 92 In this setting, if restitution is to be given a meaning
distinct from damages, it would seem to be that of a remedy based on the
gain of the person or entity covered by the statute. 93 A showing of unjust
enrichment would not seem indicated, for Congress has created a new
basis of liability for which restitution is one possible remedy of many.
Congress has also used restitution a few times to denote compensation
for losses, including not only monetary losses but intangible losses.94 This
usage is unfortunate, for it obliterates any distinction between restitution
and compensation. As many scholars and courts have suggested, the
terms "damages" or "compensation" should be reserved for loss-based
awards and "restitution" used for remedies based on the defendant's
95
gain.
Sometimes, the language surrounding "restitution" will not make evident the meaning that Congress has ascribed to the term. 96 How one
defines restitution in such an instance will turn on the mode of statutory
interpretation that is used, be it reading the term in light of scholarly
definitions, examining usage in precedent, consulting a dictionary, re92. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2000) (providing that in certain instances of unconscionable leases, court may order relief including "rescission, reformation, restitution, the
award of damages..."); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a) (West 2001) (referring to actions brought
by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation "for damages or restitution").
93. An open question with statutes that juxtapose damages and restitution (and, arguably, with statutes that associate restitution with repayment) is whether the person covered by the statute need only "give back" what was obtained or also "give up" any profit
made on what was obtained. Congress has at times indicated that a person or entity covered by statute could be liable for its gain of profits, without using the term "restitution."
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b) (2000) (providing that "damages" to contemporaneous traders for liability based on insider trading shall "not exceed the profit gained or loss avoided
in the transaction").
94. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (requiring "restitution to customers of damages proximately caused" by persons manipulating the price of agricultural
commodities); 31 U.S.C. § 6713 (2000) (providing that noncompliance by a local government with anti-discrimination laws can be remedied by "the payment of restitution to a
person injured" by the discrimination); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2000) (using restitution to
denote compensation for "injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured" by
Aleutians during World War II).
95. See, e.g., Birks, Misnomer, supra note 30, at 11 ("We have the word 'compensation'
for loss-based awards. We need 'restitution' for gain-based awards."); Laycock, The Scope
and Significance of Restitution, supra note 3, at 1283 ("[Rlestitution of the value of what
the plaintiff lost is simply compensatory damages. Used in this sense, "restitution" loses all
utility as a means of distinguishing one body of law from another.").
96. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. app. § 106(b)(3) (2000) (providing that if a federal employee is
not in compliance with ethics laws and regulations, steps taken to assure compliance may
include "divestiture, restitution, the establishment of a blind trust..."); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i4 (2000) (referring to "cases involving claims related to the provision of health care items
and services (other than funds awarded to a relator, for restitution or otherwise authorized
by law)"). One example of Congress using ambiguous language surrounding the term "restitution" is 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002) (stating that in determining a
penalty for certain violations of laws governing securities exchanges, "the Commission or
the appropriate regulatory agency may consider ... the extent to which any person was
unjustly enriched, taking into account any restitution made to persons injured by such behavior"). In speaking both of the violator's unjust enrichment and restitution to "persons
injured by" the violations, Congress creates a confusing picture as to whether restitution is
measured by the amount of the violator's unjust enrichment or by the injury to other
persons.
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viewing legislative history, looking at other statutes' usage of the term, or
some other technique.
To the extent that scholarly definitions of restitution will inform the
task of statutory interpretation, the term "restitution" arguably should be
read to mean a remedy based on the gain of the person who has violated
the statute. The current scholarly consensus is that restitution should not
be used to mean compensation of losses. Moreover, a definition of restitution as liability based on and measured by unjust enrichment does not
translate easily to a statute in which Congress has created a new liability
for which restitution is the remedy. The liability created by Congress may
or may not be analogous to a classic unjust enrichment claim, but nonetheless restitution is the specified remedy. An interpretation of restitution as a remedy based on the violator's gain would mean that the
statutory remedy is relatively bounded in comparison to a damages remedy that includes the possibility of consequential damages and damages
for non-economic loss.
In sum, Congress has used restitution inconsistently. It has used the
term to mean return of the statutory violator's gain, 97 and it has used the
term to mean compensation of losses. 98 When Congress has used restitution to mean return of the violator's gain, it has sometimes required a
showing of unjust enrichment, but more frequently, it has not required
such a showing. 99 Congress also has used restitution in a statute without
any indication on the face of the statute as to what it means by the
term. 00 Although I have suggested that in this circumstance, the most
apt scholarly definition of restitution is that of a remedy based on the
statutory violator's gain, court interpretation of what restitution means
may well turn on the mode of statutory interpretation that is used.
This section has focused on statutes explicitly using the term "restitution." As we shall see in a later section, the Supreme Court has employed the terminology of restitution to interpret statutes that make no
mention of restitution. In these cases, the ultimate question was whether
the monetary relief requested by the plaintiff was equitable. Before examining these cases, I turn to the legal and equitable components of
restitution.
II.

THE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE FACETS OF RESTITUTION

Restitution has historical roots in both the law and equity courts, a fact
that many modern courts overlook. The reporters of the original Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, credited
Lord Mansfield as the "first to have recognized the fundamental principle
97.
98.
99.
100.

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
notes 88, 94 and accompanying text.
notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
note 96 and accompanying text.
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of restitution" in English law. 10 1 In Moses v. MacFerlan,10 2 Mansfield indicated that an action of assumpsit could be brought not only upon an
express or implied contract, but also when fairness required that the
plaintiff recover against the defendant. 10 3 He stated: "If the defendant be
under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice to refund; the law
implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract. 10° 4 Mansfield explained that the
action "lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which
happens to fail; or for money got through imposition, (express or implied)
or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's
situation, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under those
circumstances." 105
Although Mansfield employed the terms "equity" and "equitable"
throughout his opinion in Moses v. MacFerlan, he used those terms in a
nontechnical way to connote fairness. 10 6 Nonetheless, some have read
Mansfield's language as supporting a classification of restitution as equitable, rather than legal.' 0 7 Professor Dobbs has explained the error of
this reading: "The use of the term equity... does not imply that all restitution cases are brought "in equity" or that equitable relief is given. It is
not a jurisdictional statement but a standard about the goal or a standard
for judging what qualifies as unjust enrichment." 10 8 Indeed, Moses v.
MacFerlan itself was a case before a court of law-the King's Bench.
Both the law courts and the equity courts entertained actions that were
based on restitutionary principles. Through the common counts in general assumpsit, the law courts developed actions based on the notion of
unjust enrichment.' 0 9 One of the common counts-the action for
"money had and received"-encompassed a broad range of situations
101. Warren Seavy & Austin Scott, Restitution, 1938
(1938).

LAW QUARTERLY REV.

29, 33

102. Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).

103. Id. at 678-81. The law of indebitatus assumpsit on which Mansfield relied is summarized in JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 149-66 (1913).
104. Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. at 681.
105. Id.
106. One of the reporters of the first Restatement, Warren Seavey, explained that:
"Restitution is the equitable principle by which one who has been enriched at the expense
of another, whether by mistake, or otherwise, is under a duty to return what he has received or its value to the other. Perhaps unjust enrichment would be a better term." Warren A. Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 257 (1954).
107. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 31, at 558 n.1.
108. Id. See also 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 1.2, at 9 ("Although Mansfield's description of quasi contract as "equitable" has been repeated many times, this refers merely to
the way in which a case should be approached, since it is clear that the action is at law and

the relief given is a simple money judgment.").
109. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 194-95 (3d ed.
1971) (discussing the common counts that developed at law and the circumstances in which
an action could lie "although there was no agreement in any sense," such as with interception by the defendant of fees due the plaintiff, "recovery of money paid by mistake, or
under compulsion, or under a void contract where the consideration had totally failed");
JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY, 149-66 (1913) (discussing actions that

developed under indebitatus assumpsit);
the common counts).

RENDLEMAN,

supra note 20, at 326-27 (discussing
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that today would fall within liability based on unjust enrichment. As one
English treatise has summarized:
The action for money had and received lay to recover money which
the plaintiff had paid to the defendant, on the ground that it had
been paid under a mistake or compulsion, or for a consideration
which had wholly failed ....

The action also lay to recover money

which the defendant had acquired from the plaintiff by a tortious act;
and, in very rare cases where the defendant had received money
which the plaintiff could still identify as his own at the time of receipt
and for which the defendant had not given consideration, the plaintiff could assert his claim by means of this action. 110
Another of the common counts-the action for "money paid"-was
available when the plaintiff's claim involved money paid to a third party,
from which the defendant had derived a benefit.I t The common counts
of quantum meruit and quantum valebat allowed recovery for services
and goods, respectively, that had been supplied by the plaintiff to the
defendant under circumstances constituting unjust enrichment.'12 The
actions for money had and received, money paid, quantum meruit, and
quantum valebat eventually were catalogued under the rubric of "quasicontract," 1 13 but it is important to appreciate that these actions were not
based on principles of contract, but rather on principles of unjust enrichment.1 14 The "quasi-contract" label apparently resulted from the fact
that these actions developed in assumpsit, where contractual actions also
developed.
The remedy for these restitutionary actions at law historically has been
a money judgment. When the benefit the defendant received is money,
the Restatement suggests that the measure of recovery at law is the
amount of money received, plus interest. 115 If the defendant used the
plaintiff's money and earned profits, the plaintiff may, under certain circumstances, have a right to those profits, but the action is in equity, not in
law.' 6 Moreover, if the defendant turned the plaintiff's money into some
110. GOFF & JONES, supra note 30, at 3 (footnote omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See GOFF & JONES, supra note 30, at 3 ("We understand quasi-contract to be that
part of restitution which stems from the common indebitatus counts for money had and
received and for money paid, and from quantum meruit and quantum valebar claims.")
114. See BAKER, supra note 109, at 195 ("In these cases [of mistake, compulsion, void
contract, etc.] the defendant had no moral right to detain the money from the plaintiff, but
the basis of recovery was equitable rather than contractual. This type of remedy was given
the name quasi-contract, a misleading anglicisation of the Roman obligation quasi ex
con tractu.").

115. See RESTATEMENT OF RESrITUTION, § 150 (1937) ("In an action of restitution in

which the benefit received was money, the measure of recovery for this benefit is the
amount of money received."); id. § 156 ("[A] person who has a duty to pay the value of a

benefit which he has received, is also under a duty to pay interest upon such value from the
time he committed a breach of duty in failing to make restitution if, and only if: (a) the
benefit consisted of a definite sum of money .... ").
116. See SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PU3LIC AND PRIVATE 779 (3d ed. 2002)
(stating that "a profit-based measure of recovery has been the exception rather than the
rule where legal restitution is concerned); but see I PALMER, supra note 3 1, § 2.12 at 158-59
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other asset, the 7plaintiff may be able to obtain that asset through an ac11
tion in equity.
The equity courts developed several restitutionary devices, the most
important of which for our purposes are the constructive trust and the
equitable lien. The constructive trust results in an order to the defendant
to convey property that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff.118 The property can take different forms. The defendant may be ordered to transfer
property that originally belonged to the plaintiff. If the defendant exchanged the plaintiff's property for a different asset, the defendant may
be ordered to give the plaintiff the new asset, even if the new asset is
worth more than the plaintiff's original property. 119 The constructive
("It is true that there are many instances in which a recovery of profits is possible only in
equity [such as when it is necessary to trace the plaintiff's property into another asset or
when the claim for profits is against a fiduciary] .... But when the case is within the reach
of quasi contract, and recovery of profits does not require the use of techniques available
only in equity, we should discard the notion that profits are recoverable only in equity, and
in a few decisions it has been discarded."). Profits could be obtained in quasi contract if
the defendant converted property of the plaintiff into something else. See id. at 26 ("[l]t
has been established for several centuries in Anglo-American law that quasi contract is
available to recover the proceeds of the sale of goods by a converter."); Kull, Restitution
and the Noncontractual Transfer, supra note 31, at 100 ("The intentional converter is not
only liable in quasi-contract for the proceeds of any resale, but may be held as a constructive trustee of any traceable product.").
117. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 202 cmt. b, illust. 3 (1937) (indicating
that when the defendant is a conscious wrongdoer who has exchanged the plaintiff's money
for other property, the plaintiff can enforce either a constructive trust on the property or
an equitable lien on the property to secure the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement from the
wrongdoer). See also 1 PALMER, supra note 31, at 59 (asserting that in tort or equitable
wrong: "Equitable relief becomes important, through the use of constructive trust, when
the owner seeks to trace the converted property into another asset, and obtain a decree
either for specific restitution or impressing a lien on the traced property to secure his
money claim. Such equitable relief is generally available, both where there has been a
conversion of tangible or intangible personal property and where there has been conversion or misappropriation of the plaintiff's money.").
118. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160, at 648 (1937) ("A constructive trust
does not arise unless there is property on which the constructive trust can be fastened, and
such property is held by the person to be charged as constructive trustee"); see also id. at
642 (noting that the chief difference between quasi contract and constructive trust is that
"the plaintiff in bringing an action to enforce a quasi-contractual obligation seeks to obtain
a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of
money, whereas the plaintiff in bringing a suit to enforce a constructive trust seeks to
recover specific property"); I PALMER, supra note 31, § 1.3 at 13 ("Quasi contract leads to
a simple money judgment, whereas the normal constructive trust decree is one for specific
restitution. . . . [T]he typical decree [in a situation of constructive trust] is that the [the
defendant] transfer title to the plaintiff.")
119. When the defendant has exchanged the plaintiff's property for a different asset,
the plaintiff may be entitled to a constructive trust on the new asset, even though that asset
may be worth more than the plaintiff's original property. The Restatement treats the plaintiff's right to a constructive trust on the new asset as dependent on the circumstances. The
Restatement indicates that in instances of conscious wrongdoing, the plaintiff can choose
between a constructive trust on the new asset or payment for the value of the original
property, secured by an equitable lien on the new asset. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 202 (1937). When the defendant is an innocent converter of the plaintiff's property, the
Restatement specifies that the plaintiff is entitled to an equitable lien upon the new property to secure its claim for restitution, but not to a constructive trust. Id. § 203. The Restatement explains the different rules as follows: "Where the converter is a conscious
wrongdoer, he can be compelled to surrender any profit which he makes by a disposition of
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trust may be imposed on a fund of money when the defendant has taken
the plaintiff's property and sold it, or it may be imposed on property that
was purchased with the plaintiff's money.
An equitable lien may be available to serve as security for a money
judgment.' 2 0 When the defendant has exchanged the plaintiff's property
or money for another asset, the plaintiff may obtain both a money judgment for the value of the plaintiff's original property and an equitable
lien imposed on the new asset to serve as security for the money judgment. 121 Moreover, when the defendant has exchanged the plaintiff's
property for money, an equitable lien may be imposed on the money to
122
secure the plaintiff's judgment for the value of the original property.
Historically, the choice between pursuing a claim at law or at equitybe it a claim for contract, tort, or unjust enrichment-was bounded by the
jurisdictional limitations of the courts. A suit in equity for specific relief
(such as for an injunction) typically could proceed only if the harm was
irreparable-in other words, the remedy at law (damages) was inadequate. 123 Because of the inadequacy doctrine, claims for money typically
had to be asserted in courts of law. Some claims for money, however,
the claimant's property, and not merely to restore to the claimant the value of his property,
since if he were permitted to keep the profit there would be an incentive to wrongdoing,
and compelling him to surrender the profit operates as a deterrent upon the wrongful disposition of the property of others.... This reason is not applicable to persons who are not
conscious wrongdoers." Id. § 203 cmt. a. When the defendant has received the plaintiff's
property without notice of the plaintiff's interest and without paying value for the property, and the defendant has exchanged the plaintiff's property for a different asset, the
defendant must either "surrender the property which he acquired in exchange, or, at his
option .... pay the value of the property which he originally received, with the new property being subject to an equitable lien" to secure the payment. Id. § 204.

120.

SCHOEN3ROD ET AL.,

supra note 116, at 779 ("An equitable lien, like any lien, is a

security interest in another's property; it gives the holder of the lien the right to sell the
property and have the proceeds applied to his claim. If the proceeds of the sale exceed the
claim, the excess belongs to the property owner (and his creditors). If the proceeds of the
sale are insufficient to satisfy the claim, the lienholder may, at least in the case of an equitable lien, have a money judgment for the deficiency."); LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 633 ("Equitable liens limit plaintiff's claim to the amount of
her loss. An equitable lien does not give her anything in excess of that even if she can trace
into something more valuable.").
121. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 161 (1937); 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 1.5
at 20-21, § 2.14 at 176 (discussing that when the defendant has acted wrongfully or when
the defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for value of the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff
is entitled to have a lien impressed on assets into which his funds are traced, with a personal judgment against the wrongdoer for any balance due after the lien has been foreclosed"). When the new asset is more valuable than the plaintiff's original property, the
plaintiff's ability to get the new asset via a constructive trust-rather than a money judgment for the value of the plaintiff's original property secured by an equitable lien on the
new asset-will depend on the culpability of the defendant. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 202 cmt. b, illus. 4-5 (1937) (giving
examples of the plaintiff's right to obtain a constructive trust or equitable lien on money
that was received by a wrongdoer in exchange for the plaintiff's property); but see 1
PALMER, supra note 31, § 1.1 at 3 ("If the defendant stole the plaintiff's goods and sold
them, the plaintiff was given a money judgment in the amount of proceeds in an action at
law.").
123. See LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 79, at
19-21 (summarizing development of the inadequacy doctrine).
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could only be heard in equity because the equity court had primary juris24
diction over the subject matter, such as in cases involving a fiduciary.'
Moreover, under the equitable "clean-up" doctrine, a court of equity
could entertain a claim for money if the claim was considered "inciden125
tal" to a request for injunctive relief.
With respect to the particular context of a restitutionary claim for
26
money, the plaintiff historically has had to assert the claim at law.'
Even if the plaintiff can identify as his a particular fund of money held by
the defendant, the plaintiff generally cannot recover the money in a suit
in equity because the legal remedy is deemed adequate.12 7 In the instance of a mistaken payment, the plaintiff must bring the claim at law
even though the defendant still holds the plaintiff's "specific" money. 1 28
Similarly, when payment of money is procured by fraud, the payor is not
29
entitled to recovery of the money in equity1
124. See 1 JOHN

N. POMEROY,

A

TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §

181, at 257

(5th ed. 1941). Hence, there developed the practice that claims against fiduciaries, including claims for restitution, were asserted in equity. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,
§ 160 cmt. e, at 645 ("Even though what is transferred is money ...the payor or transferor
is entitled to maintain a proceeding in equity for specific restitution if the payment or
transfer was procured by an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relation."); 1 PALMER,
supra note 31, § 1.6, at 35 ("equity jurisdiction over accounting by a trustee or other fiduciary usually has been continued even where an adequate remedy at law in quasi contract
has become available").
125. See Fleming James, Jr., Right to Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 65859 (1963) (describing historical development of the equitable clean up doctrine); 1 POMEROY, supra note 124, §§ 231-32 (discussing clean up doctrine).
126. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 31, § 4.1(1) at 556 ("Restitution claims for money are
usually claims "at law."); SEAVEY & SCOTTr, supra note 101, at 39 (noting that "where
money is sought to be recovered, equity will frequently release jurisdiction on the ground

that the remedy at law is adequate");

LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES,

supra

note 21, at 552 (stating that when "plaintiff seeks restitution from a solvent defendant,
quasi-contract will often yield the same recovery as constructive trust, and where there are
no profits other than the value of the thing taken, damages will work as well").
127. See, e.g., Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 49 n.7 (1989) (stating that "even
if the checks respondent seeks to recovery lay untouched in petitioners' offices, legal remedies would apparently have sufficed"). The Restatement distinguishes between a constructive trust arising (whenever a party was subject to an equitable duty to convey property to
another) and a constructive trust being specifically enforceable. The Restatement suggests
that when the defendant has property rightfully belonging to the plaintiff, a constructive
trust over the property exists, although equity will not specifically enforce the constructive

trust if the legal remedy is adequate. See

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,

§ 160, cmts. e-f

(1937); id. § 163 cmt. d. Professor Palmer characterized this analysis as "misleading," because it suggests that the constructive trust is something more than a remedy; that "it
somehow 'exists' even though equity will not enforce the rights of the equitable owner." 1
PALMER,

supra note 31, at 17-18. See also

SCHOENBROD ET AL.,

supra note 116, at 709

(noting that in instances when the defendant was not insolvent, the Restatement "viewed
the constructive trust as a substantive legal arrangement that comes into being when property is wrongfully acquired and that 'exists' even if a court of equity would not have taken
cognizance of the case" ).

128.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,

§ 160 cmt. d at 645 (1937)

129. Id. But see 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 4.23, at 559 (asserting that "[a]lthough
tracing and the imposition of an equitable lien have not been allowed for mere breach of
promise tQ pay the debt, such relief has been given when the loan was obtained through
fraud of the borrower" and citing two state cases).
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Although the general rule is that recovery of a defendant's gain of
money is not available in equity, there are important exceptions: when
the money was obtained by abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship;' 30 when the defendant is insolvent; and when the plaintiff seeks to
trace her property into another form or into the hands of a third person.
Recall that in a claim against an insolvent defendant, a plaintiff who
can identify as his certain funds held by the defendant is entitled, under
certain circumstances, to recovery of the funds. 13' This recovery is accomplished through the equitable remedies of the constructive trust or
equitable lien.' 32 With mistaken payment, for example, the Restatement
notes: "Where... the payee is insolvent, the payor can maintain a suit in
equity for the specific recovery of the money paid by mistake, if the
payee still holds it, since the money is held upon a constructive trust for
133
him."
Aside from being the means by which a plaintiff may recover specific
funds held by an insolvent defendant, the constructive trust and equitable
lien have been imposed when the plaintiff has been able to "trace" its
property or money into a substituted asset or into the hands of a third
person. 134 When a solvent defendant gains money from the plaintiff, the
key to determining whether the plaintiff's restitutionary remedy is legal
or equitable is whether there has been an exchange of the plaintiff's
130. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160 cmt. d at 645 (1937); 1 PALMER, supra
note 31, at II ("Constructive trust is used ... to deprive one in a fiduciary position of a
gain obtained through a misuse of that position.").
131. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
132. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 202 cmt. e (1937) ("The claimant can reach
the product of his property even though the wrongdoer is insolvent. This is true whether
the claimant seeks to enforce a constructive trust upon the product or to impose an equitable lien upon it."); see also id. §§ 209, 211 (concerning a plaintiff's ability to recover, via a
constructive trust or equitable lien, its funds obtained by a wrongdoer). Palmer criticized
the Restatement for allowing a claimant for restitution against an insolvent debtor to obtain
the defendant's profits, not just the plaintiff's loss. See 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 2.4(c) at
184 ("it has been thought fair to permit [tracing] to the point of allowing payment of his
claim in full, ahead of general creditors; but it is difficult to discern the fairness of allowing
him to recover more than his loss at their expense.") Palmer notes that "almost as a matter
of course the decree in favor of the claimant against an insolvent estate goes no further
than to impress a lien on the traced asset," and that "[a]part from general statements,
almost no support has been found in the decisions for the position of the Restatement."
Id.
133. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160 at 645 (1937). Cf 1 PALMER, supra note 31,
§ 4.23 at 559 (stating that when the plaintiff has loaned money, "the equitable lien will give
the lender a secured claim against the estate of an insolvent borrower").
134. See 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 2.14, at 175 ("Through tracing, a person who in the
first instance would be entitled to the restitution of money or other property is often permitted to assert his claim against a substituted asset-an asset which is traceable to or the
product of such money or other property. The end result of tracing may be a decree for
specific restitution of the traced asset, or imposing a lien on the asset to secure a money
claim, or a decree for subrogation when the plaintiff's funds have been traced into the
payment of a debt or of a charge on property."); LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 595 ("[T]he constructive trust can be used to trace the proceeds of
specific assets through a series of exchanges."). Some have criticized the availability of
tracing. See, e.g., Dale Oesterle, Restitution and Reform, 79 MICH. L. REv. 337, 359 (1980)
(suggesting that "tracing should be abandoned outside of the law of fiduciary relations").
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money for something else. If the defendant either has spent the plaintiff's
money or still has the money, then the remedy at law is adequate-the
plaintiff sues for a money judgment. If instead, the defendant has exchanged the money for a different asset, then the plaintiff has a choiceit may sue for money at law or it may sue to obtain the asset through the
constructive trust or equitable lien.1 35 Moreover, if the defendant transferred plaintiff's money to a third person who still holds the money, a
constructive trust or equitable lien may be imposed on the fund. 36 Conversely, if the defendant obtained property from the plaintiff (rather than
money) and sold it, the plaintiff may trace the property into its monetary
proceeds and get a constructive trust or equitable lien over the fund of
1 37
money.
The tracing of money or property into a substitute asset or into the
hands of a third person has been treated by U.S. authorities as available
only in equity. 138 Thus, although restitution claims for money typically
are asserted at law, a monetary remedy generally will be considered equitable restitution if tracing is required to reach the money.' 39 The desira135. See 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 2.19 ("[I]f the defendant steals or converts $10,000
of the plaintiff's funds and spends the money to purchase land or securities, the plaintiff
will be permitted to trace his money into the asset purchased and obtain specific restitution, without regard to whether a money judgment against the wrongdoer for $10,000
would be collectible . . . . Or, if the plaintiff so requests, the court will enter a $10,000
money judgment secured by a lien on the asset."). The Restatement indicates that in the
instance of a conscious wrongdoer, the plaintiff may obtain a constructive trust or equitable lien not only when the defendant has exchanged the plaintiff's money for a different
asset but also when the defendant "acquires a chose in action, as... by a deposit of the
claimant's money in the bank." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 202 cmt. g (1937). To
illustrate the chose in action situation, the Restatement asserts: "A wrongfully takes $10,000
belonging to B and deposits the money in his individual account in a bank in which he has
on deposit no funds of his own. The bank fails and pays fifty cents on the dollar. B is
entitled to the $5000 received from the bank and can hold A liable for the balance of the
$10,000." Id. at illus. 10.
136. See 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 1.6, at 35-36 ("There is little reason to doubt that
equitable relief will be given if that is the only means of reaching the particular defendant
even though quasi contract would be available against another party."); 3 PALMER, supra
note 31, § 14.3, at 155 (citing as an example of tracing into the hands of a third party the
equitable restitution of a portion of a mistaken bank deposit that was held by a third party
who was not a bona fide purchaser); cf 1 PALMER, supra note 31, §1.5, at 15 (noting that
equity could trace property into the hands of a third party and give a "simple money judgment" against the third party if the property had been sold).
137. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 202 cmt b, illust. 4-5 (1937). Not all efforts
to obtain money when the defendant exchanged the plaintiff's property for money are
pursued in equity. When the defendant has intentionally converted the plaintiff's goods
into money, the plaintiff historically has had a remedy at law for the profits. See supra note
116.
138. See 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 2.14 at 177 ("Tracing was a creature of equity and
has remained almost entirely the sole province of equity. Although there is an occasional
instance [in English cases] in which simple forms of tracing have been used in a law action,
title to a traced asset can be recovered only in equity under American decisions.") (footnotes omitted). The original Restatement places its chapter on "Following Property into its
Product" under the Part entitled "Consructive Trusts and Analogous Equitable Remedies." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, table of contents at xxii-xxv (1937). See also LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 597 ("The tracing feature of
constructive trusts is not available in any legal remedy").
139. But see infra note 341 and accompanying text.
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bility of tracing can be said to make the remedy at law inadequate.140

Professor Laycock has observed that application of the inadequacy
doctrine in modern times rarely results in the plaintiff being relegated to
legal relief if the plaintiff prefers an equitable remedy. 141 For example,
the availability of damages generally will not impede the plaintiff's ability
to obtain an injunction or specific performance. 142 In the context of restitution, scholars have noted that courts generally will honor a plaintiff's

preference for specific property over a monetary award. 143 Although the
inadequacy doctrine has little effect today on the choice between specific

relief and damages, the doctrine remains useful when traditional understandings of the law/equity divide are relevant to the classification of a
144
particular remedy as legal or equitable.
From this examination of legal and equitable restitution, one can as-

sert, as Seavey and Scott did, that "the entire subject of restitution" is
"equitable" in the sense that fairness considerations drive whether the
plaintiff is entitled to restitution. 45 At the same time, it is important to

recognize that restitution has roots in both the courts of law and the
courts of equity, with well-established rules indicating which claims are

legal and which are equitable. In particular, restitution claims for money
typically have been asserted at law, subject to a limited set of circum140. Cf. 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 2.19, at 218 (stating that the attitude of courts with
respect to tracing seems to be that "[t]he plaintiff seeks a kind of relief not available at law,
and ... that it is a kind of relief to which he is entitled if he can prove his case") (emphasis
in original); id. at 220 ("[W]hen a plaintiff seeks to trace and assert a claim against a specific asset, no case has been found in which the court refused such relief solely because of
the adequacy of the legal remedies.").
141. See generally LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra
note 79 (surveying over 1400 cases in support of his thesis that the irreparable injury rule
rarely affects the results of cases).
142. Id. at 19.
143. Palmer gave as examples of the "erosion of the adequacy test" situations involving
the plaintiff's attempt to obtain a constructive trust over specific property or an equitable
lien in specific property. Among the examples he offered are: (1) the right of a purchaser
of land, who rescinds for the vendor's fraud or breach of the executory contract, to sue in
equity to obtain a money judgment and a vendee's lien on the property; (2) the right of one
who conveys land because of defendant fraud to recover the land in equity rather than be
relegated to a quasi-contract action for the value of the land; and (3) the right of a plaintiff
whose corporate shares have been obtained by the defendant through fraud to recover the
shares even though a monetary award in quasi contract would be available. 1 PALMER,
supra note 31, at 38-39. Professor Dobbs has suggested, in the context of a discussion
about the right to jury trial, that "the adequacy of legal remedy seems irrelevant" to the
availability of a constructive trust because the plaintiff does not assert a legal right but an
equitable interest." I DOBBS, supra note 31, at 595. He further asserts that "[a]t least some
authorities support the view that a claim for a constructive trust may be pursued even if the
legal remedy is adequate and even if the trust would yield only money that could be recovered at law." Id. at 595-96. The only citation for this assertion is a 1946 New Jersey state
court case. The view that a constructive trust may be pursued even if the trust would yield
only money that could be recovered at law is contradicted at several points in the Restatement. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
144. See LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 79, at
viii (writing that although he seeks "to eliminate the last remnant of the conception that
equity is subordinate, extraordinary, or unusual," a distinction between legal and equitable
remedies nonetheless remains relevant "where it is codified").
145. SEAVEY & Sco'i-r, supra note 101, at 42.
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stances: when the defendant was insolvent and the plaintiff could identify
as his certain money held by the defendant; when the plaintiff sought to
trace property or money into its monetary proceeds or into the hands of a
third person; when the monetary award was incidental to an injunction;
when abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship was involved; or
146
when equity otherwise had primary jurisdiction over the case.
III.

COURT TREATMENTS OF MONETARY REMEDIES
AS RESTITUTION

Supreme Court pronouncements about the classification of monetary
restitution have occurred primarily in two settings: cases considering
whether a statute permitted the remedy requested by the plaintiff and
cases involving the right to jury trial. In many of the cases, the ultimate
question for the Court was whether the relief requested was legal or equitable. By examining several of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
statutory authorization of relief and the right to jury trial, it is possible to
identify the Court's first missteps in classifying monetary restitution and
to trace how these comments led the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts to commit more significant errors in later cases. These errors have
been classifying monetary remedies as restitution when the remedies
should have been classified as damages and suggesting that restitution is
exclusively an equitable remedy. 147 After examining the Supreme Court
decisions labeling certain monetary remedies as restitution, this Part focuses on the remedy of backpay to exemplify the confused manner in
which courts have used the terminology of restitution to classify a monetary remedy as damages or restitution and as legal or equitable.

A.

STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION OF RELIEF

In determining whether various statutes authorized the monetary relief
sought by plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has at times discussed whether
the requested relief was restitution. Interestingly, these discussions have
not occurred in cases involving statutes that explicitly allowed restitution,
but mainly in two types of cases: (1) where Congress authorized injunctive relief and the question was whether the monetary remedy requested
by the plaintiff was permitted as "incidental" to the injunction, and (2)
148
where Congress authorized "equitable" remedies.
146. See supra notes 123-25, 130-40 and accompanying text.

147. The practical consequences of these classification mistakes can be significant. For
example, classification errors have resulted in deprivation of the right to jury trial. See
infra notes 283 and accompanying text.
148. The Supreme Court has also referred briefly to restitution in addressing the difference between specific monetary relief and "money damages." Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. 879 (1988), discussed supra note 79. One of the reasons the Bowen majority
offered for concluding that the relief sought was not "money damages" was that "the specific agency action that reverses a decision [by the agency to disallow reimbursement] is
described as 'restitution' in the statute." Id. at 893. See 42 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (2000) (mandating that if the agency reverses a disallowance decision, the Secretary "shall certify restitution forthwith in a lump sum of any funds incorrectly withheld or otherwise denied").
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The Supreme Court's first important discussion of monetary relief as
restitution came in Porter v. Warner Holding Co. 1 4 9 In Porter,the Office
of Price Administration brought an action against a landlord for charging
rents that exceeded maximums established under the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942.150 The Administrator brought suit under section
205(a) of the Act, which authorized courts to grant an injunction, a restraining order, or "other order," upon a showing that the defendant had
violated or was about to violate the Act.' 5' Initially asking the district
court to enjoin the landlord from exceeding the rent ceilings, the Administrator later added a request for "restitution" to the tenants of the exces152
sive rents that had already been collected.
The Administrator's use of restitution fits scholarly definitions of the
term. The claim for return of the excessive rents seems to fall within a
definition of restitution as liability based on and measured by unjust enrichment. Liability for retaining rents in excess of statutory maximums
can be analogized to liability for retaining overpayments under a contract-a classic example of unjust enrichment.1 5 3 Moreover, a definition
of restitution as the yielding up of the defendant's gains at the plaintiff's
expense would also seem to fit the remedy here, although the plaintiff is
the Administrator, acting on behalf of the tenants who would receive the
money.
The question for the courts was whether the statute permitted restitution of the overpayments. The district court, although granting the Administrator's request for an injunction, declined to order restitution,
saying that the statute did not authorize such relief. 154 The Supreme
Court disagreed. First, the Supreme Court noted that the Administrator
had invoked the equitable jurisdiction of the district court by seeking an
injunction under section 205(a). 155 The Court reasoned that unless otherwise provided by statute, once "the equitable jurisdiction of the [district]
court has properly been invoked for injunctive purposes, the court has
the power to ... award complete relief,"'1 56 and that the requested restitution could be viewed as an "equitable adjunct to an injunction deJustice Scalia in dissent challenged the implication in the majority opinion that restitution

is not "money damages." Id. at 917 n.2 ("I doubt that the term [restitution] in the statute is
a term of art, or has anything to do with the issue before us here. But if the Court means
to suggest otherwise, I point out that "restitution" in the judicial context commonly consists of money damages.").
149. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
150. 50 U.S.C. § 925(a) (repealed 1956).
151. 328 U.S. at 396-97.
152. Id.
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF REs'rrruroN, § 6 cmt. c, illust. 9 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, April 6, 2001) (stating that tenant has a right to restitution of overpayment of rent
due to landlord's error in overcharging tenant).
154. Porter, 328 U.S. at 397.
155. Id. at 397-99.
156. Id. at 398-99.
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cree."' 157 The Court's reasoning was consistent with the equitable cleanup doctrine-the notion that an equity court has the power to decree all
relief, including incidental legal relief, necessary to achieve justice between the parties. Thus, the Court was not suggesting that restitution of
money is an equitable remedy rather than a legal remedy; to the contrary,
the Court was careful to note that restitution of the illegal rents "could
not be obtained through an independent suit in equity if an adequate le15 8
gal remedy were available.
Second, the Supreme Court stated that an order for restitution of the
illegal rents could be considered necessary to enforce compliance with
15 9
the Act and to effectuate the statutory purpose of preventing inflation.
The Court found that Congress intended that courts of equity have the
power under section 205(a) to fashion appropriate remedies. 160 The potential barrier to this reasoning was that another portion of the Act, section 205(e), explicitly authorized monetary remedies. Under that section,
a tenant could sue on his or her own behalf for recovery of up to 16three
1
If
times the amount of the overcharges, plus attorney's fees and costs.
the tenant did not bring suit within thirty days of the violation or for
some reason was not entitled to bring suit, the Administrator could sue
on behalf of the United States for the same remedies. 162 The Court in
Porter characterized these monetary remedies as "damages" and found
that section 205(e) provided the "exclusive remedy relative to damages.' 63 It is important to note that the Supreme Court was using the
term "damages" in a very broad sense to describe the remedies in section
205(e); certainly those remedies could not be considered solely compensatory damages, because a tenant was entitled to up to three times the
amount of overcharges.
The Supreme Court found that a district court under section 205(a)
could grant the Administrator's request for recovery of illegal rents on
behalf of the tenants because the relief sought was restitution, unlike the
remedies authorized under section 205(e). The Court explained:
Restitution, which lies within [the jurisdiction of equity courts under
section 205(a)], is consistent with and differs greatly from the damages and penalties which may be awarded under § 205(e) ....
When the Administrator seeks restitution under § 205(a), he does
not request the court to award statutory damages to the purchaser or
tenant or to pay to such person part of the penalties which go to the
United States Treasury in a suit by the Administrator under § 205(e).
Rather he asks the court to act in the public interest by restoring the
157. Id. at 399. ("Nothing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an
injunction than the recovery of that which has been illegally acquired and which has given
rise to the necessity for injunctive relief.").
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 400.
160. Porter, 328 U.S. at 401.
161. 50 U.S.C. § 925(e) (repealed 1947).
162. Id.
163. Porter, 328 U.S. at 401.
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status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to
the purchaser or tenant. Such action is within the recognized
power
164
and within the highest tradition of a court of equity.
Later decisions have read the Porter language of "restoring the status
quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant" as a definition that distinguishes restitution from compensatory damages.' 65 Such an interpretation pulls the language out of
context. The Court in Porter had no occasion to distinguish compensatory damages from restitution, but rather was faced with deciding
whether monetary relief incidental to an injunction could be awarded
without circumventing the scheme of treble damages and attorney's fees
set forth in section 205(e). Furthermore, "restoration of a loss to the
plaintiff" does not distinguish restitution from compensation or damages
when the loss is that of money. 1 66 The Court's language should not be
read as providing a meaningful distinction between restitution and
compensation.
The above passage in Porter has also been misread as indicating that
restitution is exclusively an equitable remedy. 16 7 Again, the context of
the Court's language is crucial. The Court's assertion that the restitutionary relief requested in Porter was "within the recognized power and
within the highest tradition of a court of equity" was made for the limited
purpose of holding that a court whose injunctive powers have been invoked also has the power to award incidental monetary relief. 168 Porter
thus does not in any way depart from the historical understanding of restitution as having counterparts both in law and equity.
In Mitchell v. DeMarioJewelry, 169 another case involving the availability of monetary relief incidental to a request for an injunction, the Supreme Court cited Porter extensively. Mitchell involved a suit by the
Secretary of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 170 Alleging that
an employer had violated the Act by discriminating against employees
who had lodged labor-related complaints, the Secretary sought an injunction against the discrimination and an award of backpay for employees
who had been discharged as a result of the discrimination. 171 The Act
granted courts the power to "restrain violations" of certain provisions of
1 72
the Act, but it did not explicitly authorize backpay.
164. Id. at 402. Justice Rutledge dissented in Porter, asserting that a restitution remedy
should not have been recognized because Congress specified the remedies it intended to
make available. Id. at 405-08 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
165. See infra notes 269, 316-19 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
167. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
168. In the context of the right to jury trial, the Supreme Court has held that when a
claim for legal relief is joined with a claim for equitable relief, the historic power of equity
to award incidental monetary relief does not apply. That is, the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial on the legal claim. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
169. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
170. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 217 (2000).
171. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289-90.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 217.
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The issue for the Supreme Court was whether a district court had the
authority to award backpay when combined with a request for an injunction. Citing Porter for the proposition that a court of equity has the
power to render "complete relief" unless Congress has circumscribed that
power, 173 the Court determined that a trial court did have the authority
to award backpay. 174 Thus, Mitchell is another example of the power of a
court to award a monetary remedy incidental to an injunction. As Porter
made clear, "complete relief" includes monetary remedies that, had they
not been combined with a request for an injunction, would be considered
legal in nature.
The Court equated the backpay remedy in Mitchell to the recovery of
'175
overcharges in Porter,terming both remedies to be "reimbursement.
Although the Court also stated that "the measure of reimbursement
[sought by the Secretary of Labor] is compensatory," its "reimbursement" terminology, equating backpay to recovery of overcharges, has led
to confusion about the nature of backpay, with some courts characterizing backpay as inherently restitutionary and equitable. 7 6 As will be discussed later, backpay generally should not be characterized as restitution,
but rather as damages. 177 Moreover, Mitchell, like Porter, involved
whether equity encompassed monetary relief incidental to an injunction;
it is misread when cited for the broad proposition that restitution is
equitable.
Although Porter and Mitchell, decided in 1946 and 1960, respectively,
involved monetary remedies that were allowed as incidental to statutorily-authorized injunctions, recent Supreme Court cases discussing monetary restitution have addressed whether a statutory authorization of
"equitable relief" permitted the plaintiffs' requested remedies. Beginning in 1993 and culminating most recently with Great-West, the Court
173. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291. After quoting from Porter extensively, the Court in
Mitchell added that "[w]hen Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of
prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant
of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes." Id. at 291-92. Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act provided that a court did

not have the authority to "order the payment to employees of unpaid minimum wages" in
an action brought by the Secretary of Labor to restrain discharge or discrimination against
employees who had lodged labor-related complaints. The majority determined that this
statutory language applied only to current employees and did not limit a court's ability to
award backpay to former employees who had been discharged in violation of the Act. Id.
at 293-96.
174. Id. at 291-96.
175. Id. at 291 (describing Porter as upholding the "implied power to order reimbursement" of rent overcharges); id. at 289 (characterizing question in Mitchell as whether district court had the power to "order reimbursement for loss of wages" caused by
discrimination).
176. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71
(1990) (in case determining whether litigant was entitled to a jury trial, characterizing
backpay in Mitchell as restitutionary and stating that damages are "equitable where they
are restitutionary"); Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1022 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Mitchell
in support of conclusion that backpay awarded for retaliatory discharge under ERISA is

restitution and therefore an equitable remedy).
177. See infra Part III.C.

1612

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

has discussed restitution in interpreting various provisions of the Em178
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,179 the plaintiffs sought a monetary
award against a nonfiduciary alleged to have knowingly participated in a
fiduciary's breach of duties under ERISA. Justice Scalia, writing for a
five-member majority that included Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Souter,
and Blackmun, first described the remedies that ERISA provides against
fiduciaries, in contrast to nonfiduciaries. 180 The Court characterized the
statutory language that a fiduciary must "make good to [the] plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach" as a provision for
"damages," while it characterized the statutory language that a fiduciary
must "restore to [the] plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through 8use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary" as a provision for
"restitution."' ' Here, the Court's use of "restitution" is consistent with
scholarly definitions of the term. The statutory liability created is analogous to a classic claim for unjust enrichment-the claim for restitution of
profits against a fiduciary who acquired a benefit by breaching a duty to
the beneficiary. 182 Moreover, under a definition of restitution as the
yielding up of defendant's gain at the plaintiff's expense, the return to the
plan of the fiduciary's profits is appropriately characterized as restitution.
Having described the ERISA remedies against fiduciaries, the Supreme Court then turned to the plaintiffs' claim for relief against a nonfiduciary. The plaintiffs sued the actuary of a qualified pension plan
(Hewitt), claiming that it had knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary duties by plan fiduciaries. The plaintiffs sought monetary relief for
the losses the plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of duties.
The plaintiffs brought their claim against Hewitt under section 502(a)(3)
of ERISA, which authorizes a plan beneficiary or participant to bring a
civil action:
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
[ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan ....-183
The plaintiffs asserted that their request that Hewitt make the plan whole
for the losses to the plan would constitute "other appropriate equitable
184
relief" under section 502(a)(3).
178. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000). See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Bank v. Solomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
179. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
180. Id. at 252. Among a fiduciary's duties under ERISA are "'the proper management, administration, and investment of [plan] assets, the maintenance of proper records,
the disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest."' Id. at
251-52 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1985)
and citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000)).
181. Id. at 252. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
182. See RESTArEMENT OF REs-rrruTiiON, § 138(1) (1937).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
184. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253.
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The Court majority expressed doubt as to whether section 502(a)(3)
affords a cause of action-irrespective of the remedy-against
nonfiduciaries who participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty. 185 Nonetheless, the Court majority did not decide whether a cause of action existed because the defendant expressly disclaimed reliance on that point.
The majority decided only whether the relief sought could be considered
86
equitable.'
The Court characterized the remedy requested by the plaintiffs as
"compensatory damages-monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties." 187 This is an
accurate characterization, for the remedy sought was directed at the
plaintiffs' losses. Certainly the relief could not be characterized as restitution, because Hewitt had not gained any benefit at the plaintiffs'
188
expense.
The Court acknowledged that damages are "the classic form of legal
relief,"' 8 9 but because ERISA had roots in the law of trusts, the Court
considered whether the damages sought by the plaintiffs could fall within
the authorization of "appropriate equitable relief" in section 502(a)(3).
185. Id. at 253-54. The Court explained:
We note at the outset that it is far from clear that, even if this provision does
make money damages available, it makes them available for the actions at
issue here. It does not, after all, authorize "appropriate equitable relief" at
large, but only "appropriate equitable relief" for the purpose of "redress[ing
any] violations or . . . enforc[ing] any provisions" of ERISA or an ERISA
plan. No one suggests that any term of the Kaiser plan has been violated,
nor would any be enforced by the requested judgment. And while ERISA
contains various provisions that can be read as imposing obligations upon
nonfiduciaries, including actuaries, no provision explicitly requires them to
avoid participation (knowing or unknowing) in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty ....
[Although we acknowledge the oddity of resolving a dispute
over remedies where it is unclear that a remediable wrong has been alleged,
we decide this case on the narrow battlefield the parties have chosen, and
reserve decision of that antecedent question.
Id. at 254.
186. Id. at 254-55.
187. Id. at 255.
188. The Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals held that restitution was unavailable and that the plaintiffs had not challenged that holding. Id. The appellate court's
reasoning as to why restitution was unavailable helpfully distinguishes between compensation and restitution:
[T]he plaintiffs had not alleged that Hewitt received anything other than its
compensation for actuarial services. . . . Restitution was not available because unjust enrichment to support the plaintiffs' claim was not alleged. ...
The plaintiffs allege that Hewitt was paid by Kaiser, not from assets of the
plan. It is not possible, therefore, to frame a claim for restitution in terms of
the recovery of plan assets wrongfully obtained by Hewitt. The plaintiffs argue that to the extent Kaiser was paying Hewitt, it was doing so as remuneration for breach of Hewitt's statutory duty and that all payments received by
Hewitt were thus "unjust enrichment." The plaintiffs, however, have provided no authority that supports this theory. Moreover, to accept the plaintiffs' argument would be to obliterate the already blurry distinction between
restitution and damages at law.
See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 948 F.2d 607, 612 (9th Cir. 1991).
189. Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 (citations omitted).
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The Court commented that the language "appropriate equitable relief"
could mean "whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in
the particular case at issue."' 190 Because courts of equity historically had
primary jurisdiction over breach of trust actions and had the power to
render all appropriate relief against the trustee, such an interpretation
would mean that section 502(a)(3) authorized the relief sought by the
plaintiffs. 19' The Court, however, determined that Congress chose the
terms "equitable relief" to connote "those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity."' 92 The Court reasoned that if the statute
were read to authorize all relief available in an equity court for breach of
trust, the statutory language "would limit the relief not at all."'1 93 The
four dissenting justices disagreed with this interpretation of the statute,
arguing that the phrase "appropriate equitable relief" should be read to
mean remedies that were available in equity courts for breach of trust,
94
which would include compensatory damages.
Because the majority concluded that compensatory damages were not
"typically available in equity," it concluded that the plaintiffs did not seek
relief authorized by the statute. Rather than leaving it at that, the Court
made unnecessary and inaccurate statements about restitution. It declared that "injunction, mandamus, and restitution" were typically available in equity. 95 Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court asserted that
restitution, like the injunction, is a "remedy traditionally viewed as 'equitable."1 96 It also commented that equitable relief "includes restitution of
ill-gotten plan assets or profits."' 97 The Court did not offer any precedent or other support for these statements.
There are serious problems with the way Mertens characterized restitution. The Court erred in lumping restitution (and mandamus) together
with injunctive relief and terming these remedies typically available in
equity. The injunction is the quintessential equitable remedy, historically
available only in the courts of equity. The writ of mandamus, contrary to
the Court's claim, was the prerogative of courts of law, not courts of equity.' 98 Restitution was available in the law courts as well as the equity
courts. 199
190. Id. at 256.
191. Id. at 255-57.

192. Id. at 256.
193. Id. at 257.
194. Id. at 263 (White, J. dissenting). Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor. The dissent pointed out the anomaly of construing ERISA in such a way as to "afford less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted." Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
195. Mertens, 598 U.S. at 256.
196. Id. at 255 ("Petitioners ... do not seek ... a remedy traditionally viewed as "equitable," such as injunction or restitution.").
197. Id. at 260 ("[E]ven in its more limited sense, the 'equitable relief' awardable under
section 502(a)(5) [of ERISA] includes restitution of ill-gotten plan assets or profits" ).
198. See 1 W. Hl-OLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 226 (7th ed. 1956); THEODORE

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 173 (5th ed. 1956).
199. See Part III.A. Some have suggested that restitution at law is "the most ancient
and significant part of restitution." GOFF & JONES, supra note 30, at 3 ("Restitutionary
PLUCKNE'I-r,
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Moreover, the Court's comment in Mertens that equitable relief includes restitution of ill-gotten assets or profits sweeps much of what his-

torically would have been considered restitution at law under the scope of
equity. Recall that most claims for monetary restitution proceeded at
law, in the action of quasi-contract. Aside from cases where equity had

primary jurisdiction of the subject matter (as with trusts) or could grant a
monetary award incidental to an injunction, a claim for "ill-gotten assets
or profits" would proceed in equity only if the plaintiff had need of a
constructive trust. Defendant insolvency or the necessity of tracing the
plaintiff's property or money into its proceeds were the triggering condi-

tions for the constructive trust.
A dissenting opinion, authored by Justice White and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor, disagreed with

the majority's reading of the statutory language "appropriate equitable
relief" as meaning relief "typically available in equity.

' 20 0

Rather, the

dissent suggested that the statutory language should mean "that relief
which was available in the courts of equity for a breach of trust. '20 1 Such
relief included "a compensatory monetary award .. .not only against
trustees for breach of duty, but also against nonfiduciaries knowingly participating in a breach of trust." 20 2 The dissent did not comment on the
majority's assertion that restitution was a remedy typically available in
equity.
Although Mertens did not explicitly reject the proposition that restitution can be a legal remedy, its language associating restitution with equity
obscured the existence of restitution at law. The Supreme Court in the
past had acknowledged that restitution was available both at law and equity, 20 3 but other cases, like Mertens, had used the phrase "equitable res-

claims are to be found in equity as well as at law. But the common law of quasi-contract is
the most ancient and significant part of restitution and, for that reason, restitution is more
easily understood if approached through that topic.").
200. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263-74.
201. Id. at 263.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Porter,328 U.S. at 399 (noting that restitution of overcharges could not be
obtained through an independent suit in equity if remedy at law would be adequate); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935). In Atlantic Coast Line, the
Court considered whether a railroad should refund freight charges that exceeded lawful
rates-relief that the Court termed "restitution." The case had been brought on the equity
side of the U.S. district court because the plaintiffs initially had sought injunctive relief. Id.
at 306, 310-14. The Court found that there were several equitable considerations favoring
the railroad and denied restitution. Id. at 310-17 (citing Moses v. MacFerlan, the Court
remarked that these equitable considerations would have affected the claim of restitution
even if the case had been brought in a court of law). Id. at 313-14. Atlantic Coast Line was
decided before the merger of law and equity accomplished by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, and before the publication of the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION in
1937. The Court accurately indicated that restitution was available in both law and equity
courts and that equitable considerations relevant to whether restitution should be awarded
in a particular case apply to both types of courts.
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titution" indiscriminately. 20 4
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,2 0 5 the Supreme Court majority distinguished between legal and equitable restitution. The Court revisited the question of the types of monetary relief that
fall within the ambit of section 502(a)(3). Eric Knudson had a health
plan through his employer. His wife at the time, Janette Knudson, was
injured in a car accident. The plan covered $411,157.11 of her medical
expenses, most of which was paid by the plan's insurance company,
Great-West.2 0 6 Under reimbursement provisions, the plan had a right to
recover from a beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the plan that
the beneficiary was entitled to recover from a third party. Specifically,
the plan had a first lien over recovery from a third party, and if the beneficiary failed to reimburse the plan for such recovery, the beneficiary became "personally liable to [the plan] . . . up to the amount of the first
lien." '20 7 A separate agreement assigned to Great-West the plan's rights
20 8
to any reimbursement claim.
The Knudsons settled a lawsuit they had filed against the manufacturer
of their car and other alleged tortfeasors, with the bulk of the $650,000
recovery going to attorney's fees and to a Special Needs Trust for Janette's medical care. Of the settlement, approximately $13,000 (the portion of the settlement attributable to past medical expenses) was
earmarked to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. The amount of
the settlement dedicated to a trust for Janette's medical care was allocated directly to the trust. The remaining amount of the settlement went
to the Knudsons' attorney, who was in turn obliged to tender a check to
2 09
Great-West.
Instead of cashing the check sent by the Knudsons' attorney, GreatWest filed suit in federal court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce the reimbursement provisions
of the plan by requiring the Knudsons to pay the plan $411,157.11.210 For
Great-West's claim to fall within the coverage of section 502(a)(3), its
requested remedy had to be considered a request "to enjoin any act" that
violates the terms of the plan or "other appropriate equitable relief" that
would redress violations of the plan or enforce provisions of the plan.
Justice Scalia authored the five-person majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas,
and he qualified some of his earlier language in Mertens. The majority
determined that Great-West had not stated a claim for relief authorized
204. See, e.g., Guardian's Ass'n v. Civil Serv. of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (plural-

ity opinion) (using phrase "equitable restitution" without differentiating between restitution at law and restitution in equity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
205. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).

206. Id. at 207-08.
207. Id. at 207.
208. Id.

209. Id.
210. Id. at 208.
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by section 502(a)(3) because it was seeking "to impose personal liability
on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that was
not typically available in equity."'21 1 The majority rejected two arguments
submitted by Great-West to characterize its action as covered by section
502(a)(3): (1) that Great-West was seeking to "enjoin" a violation of the
plan; and (2) that the relief requested was equitable because it was
212
restitution.
The majority asserted that Great-West could not seek an injunction or
specific performance to "enforce a contractual obligation to pay money
213
past due," because such relief was not typically available in equity.
Thus, the lawsuit did not fall within the statute as an attempt "to enjoin
any act." Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter on this point. 2 14 As to
whether Great-West's suit could be characterized as one for "other equitable relief," the majority assumed that the relief requested was for restitution, as did the four-person dissent authored by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by Justices Souter, Breyer, and Stevens. The majority and dissent
2 15
differed over whether the remedy was legal or equitable.
The majority opinion did not discuss why the requested remedy should
be characterized as restitution. Also problematic is that the majority conflated damages with restitution, stating: "[T]he restitution sought here by
Great-West is . . . a freestanding claim for money damages. '216 Elsewhere in the opinion, the majority equated the plaintiff's requested relief
to damages, 217 but it later discussed the remedy as if it were restitution.
The majority's language mixing restitution and damages is likely to perpetuate confusion in the courts about the difference between the two.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent claimed that "it was beyond dispute" that the
211. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
212. The majority also rejected an argument by the United States, as amicus, that the
common law of trusts provided Great-West with equitable remedies. Id. at 219.
213. Id. at 210-12.
214. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter on this point. Id. at 221-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("I am persuaded that Congress intended the word 'enjoin,' as used in
§ 502(a)(3)(A), to authorize any appropriate order that prohibits or terminates a violation
of an ERISA plan, regardless of whether a precedent for such an order can be found in
English Chancery cases.").
215. None of the opinions in Great-West discussed whether Great-West could be seen to
be requesting equitable relief in its effort to enforce the "first lien" that was created by the
plan on a beneficiary's recovery from a third party.
216. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 218 n.4. This is not the first time that Justice Scalia has
expressly equated restitution with damages. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 917
n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I doubt that the term [restitution] in the statute is a term
of art, or has anything to do with the issue before us here. But if the Court means to
suggest otherwise, I point out that "restitution" in the judicial context commonly consists
of money damages."). For further discussion of Bowen, see supra notes 79, 148.
217. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210-12. The Great-West majority quoted from a dissent by
Justice Scalia in which he had stated broadly that "[ailmost invariably.., suits seeking...
to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money damages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of legal duty."). Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted in Great-West,
534 U.S. at 210).
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requested relief was restitution.2 1 8 For support, she asserted that: "the
relief would operate to transfer from the Knudsons funds over which
Great-West claims to be the rightful owner"; "Great-West alleges that the
Knudsons would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the funds";
and "Great-West sued to recover an amount
representing the Knudsons'
''
unjust gain, rather than Great West's loss. 219

It is debatable whether the monetary remedy requested by Great-West
should have been classified as restitution. Great-West was seeking
money from the Knudsons pursuant to reimbursement provisions in the
health plan contract that Eric Knudson had with his employer. The obligation of the Knudsons to reimburse Great-West was based directly on
contract liability.2 20 Although one might say that the defendants would

be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the money owed to GreatWest, the unjust enrichment theory seems secondary, for the contract theory more conventionally describes the basis of liability.2 2' A tentative
draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
supports this characterization, for it differentiates claims for subrogation
based on insurance contracts from claims for subrogation that are "independent of contract" and based on principles of restitution and unjust
222
enrichment.
The remedy Great-West requested was payment of a debt rooted in the
contractual obligation. The remedy could be said to be measured in some
sense by the gain to the Knudsons-the amount of double recovery they
received as a result of payments from both Great-West and the tort defendants. The remedy, however, could just as easily be characterized as
measured by Great-West's loss resulting from the breach of contract, a
contract that defined the terms of repayment. Characterized as such, the
remedy would be for damages, a legal remedy. If the majority had clearly
defined the predominant theory of liability in the case as contract rather
than restitution, it could more easily have explained its conclusion that
the relief requested was legal.
Under a definition of restitution as the yielding up of defendant's gain
at the plaintiff's expense-independent of liability based on unjust enrichment-then Great-West's claim could be classified as restitution. The
health plan contract called for the beneficiary to reimburse the plan if the
218. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229.
219. Id.

220. Although the Great-West majority at times deemed the remedy requested by
Great-West to be restitution, it also characterized Great-West's claim as based on contract.
Id. at 214 ("The basis for petitioners' claim is not that respondents hold particular funds
that, in good conscience, belong to petitioners, but that petitioners are contractually enti-

tled to some funds for benefits that they conferred.").
221. See note 68 and accompanying text. See also Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra
note 4, at 1197 (asserting "that a rationalized law of restitution-a law of restitution based
exclusively on unjust enrichment-has no independent role to play in legal disputes arising

out of enforceable contracts").
222.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION

(Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 1, 2002).

AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT,

§ 26 cmt.

a
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beneficiary recovered from a third party. 22 3 Reimbursement to the plan
after the beneficiary received payments from a third party is essentially a
"yielding up" of the beneficiary's gain.
Although it is arguable whether the remedy requested should have
been classified as restitution, the ultimate question for the Court was
whether the remedy was legal or equitable. Justice Scalia's majority opinion relied on historical differences between restitution at law and restitution at equity to conclude that the relief sought by Great-West was
legal. 224 Justice Ginsburg's opinion stressed that because restitution could
be afforded in equity courts (in addition to law courts), it was relief "typically available in equity" as required by Mertens. Ginsburg accordingly
sought an equitable remedy within the scope
concluded that Great-West
2 25
of section 502(a)(3).
Justice Scalia in Great-West qualified his earlier language in Mertens
that restitution is relief that was "typically available in equity. '2 26 Quoting an opinion by Judge Posner, Scalia asserted that "'all the [Supreme]
Court meant [in Mertens and other cases] was that restitution, in contrast
to damages, is a remedy commonly ordered in equity cases and therefore
an equitable remedy in a sense in which damages, though occasionally
awarded in equity cases, are not.'"227 Scalia noted that some prior Supreme Court decisions, including Mertens, had not distinguished between
legal and equitable restitution because such a distinction was not relevant
228
to disposition of those cases.
In deciding that Great-West sought legal restitution, the majority contrasted imposition of personal liability on the defendant, which it said was
a legal remedy, with imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on
particular property held by the defendant, which it said was an equitable
remedy.22 9 In describing historical practice, the majority stated:
In cases in which the plaintiff "could not assert title or right to possession of particular property, but in which he might be able to show
just grounds for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had received from him," the plaintiff had a right to restitution at
law through an action derived from the common law writ of assumpsit .... In such cases, the plaintiff's claim was considered legal be223. Birks likely would call the health plan reimbursement provisions a contract for
restitution. BIRKS, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 30, at 19
(describing as a contract to make restitution the handing over of money "in exchange for a
promise by the other to return it in certain events"). See also Birks, Unjust Enrichment,
supra note 30, at 1775 ("If I lose my wallet on Friday evening and have to borrow $100
from you to get me through the weekend, your right to demand $100 on Monday is clearly
restitutionary: I must give back the value received, but the source of the restitutionary right
is contract, not unjust enrichment. It is just the same where, by contract, we lay down a
regime for the repayment of sums to be paid by one of us in the event of the other's failing
to come up with the expected quid pro quo.").
224. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-17.
225. Id. at 227-32.
226. Id. at 215 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
227. Id. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)).
228. Id. at 215.
229. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-18.
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cause he sought "to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal
liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money."
....In contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily
in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money
or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff
could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defen230
dant's possession.
Because Great-West was not seeking particular funds in the possession of
the Knudsons-the funds paid by the tort defendants were in the Special
Needs Trust-the majority reasoned that Great-West was not seeking eq231
uitable relief.
The majority's language might be read to suggest that restitution of
property belonging to the plaintiff but in the defendant's possession is
always equitable. The Great-West majority's characterization of Harris
Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.2 32 lends support for
such a reading. In Harris Trust, a unanimous Supreme Court found that
"an action for restitution against a [nonfiduciary] transferee of tainted
plan assets" requests equitable relief within the scope of section
502(a)(3).2 3 3 The Great-West majority stated that "the relief we described
in Harris Trust-a claim to specific property (or its proceeds) held by the
defendant-accords with the restitution we describe as equitable
234
today.
With respect to a restitutionary claim for money, however, a plaintiff
generally cannot sue in equity, even when the plaintiff can identify as hers
a specific fund of money held by the defendant.2 35 This is because the
remedy at law (historically available at quasi-contract) is deemed adequate. 236 Thus, the Great-West majority incorrectly suggested that a claim
for specific money in the possession of the defendant by itself implies
equitable, as opposed to legal, restitution.
Rather than resting the distinction between legal and equitable restitution of a fund solely on whether the defendant holds the fund that the
plaintiff seeks, the majority should have cited those unique circumstances
when equity can entertain a restitution claim for a specific fund of money.
230. Id. at 213 (citations omitted). See also id. at 214 ("For restitution to lie in equity,
the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to
restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property that are in the defendant's
possession.").
231. Id. at 214.
232. 530 U.S. 238 (2000).
233. Id. at 253.
234. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215.
235. See supra notes 115-17, 126-29 and accompanying text.
236. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160 at 644-45 ("[W]here money paid by one
person to another as a result of a mistake of such character that the payor is entitled to
restitution, he is ordinarily not entitled to maintain a suit in equity for the specific recovery
of the money, even though the payee still holds the money so that specific restitution
would be possible, since a quasi-contractual action at law would given an adequate remedy."); Seavey & Scott, supra note 101, at 39 (noting that "where money is sought to be
recovered, equity will frequently refuse jurisdiction on the ground that the remedy at law is
adequate"). See also supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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The most prominent are the instances of defendant insolvency or of plaintiff necessity to trace property or money into its proceeds, either because
the property or fund has been converted into another form or because it
has been transferred to someone else. The power of courts to impose a
constructive trust on a fund held by a transferee explains why the restitution requested in Harris Trust is appropriately characterized as equitable.
Under the majority's reasoning in Great-West, the insurance company
apparently could have sued the trustee of the Special Needs Trust because the Trust had "possession" of the requested funds. 237 Justice Ginsburg argued that under this view, "whether relief is 'equitable' would turn
entirely on the designation of the defendant. 23a8 She noted that the substance of the relief Great-West could have obtained in a suit against the
trustee-a judgment ordering the return of wrongfully withheld funds-is
''2 39
identical to the relief Great-West in fact sought from the Knudsons.
This seeming anomaly, however, is explained by the historical divide between law and equity. The way to reach funds in the possession of the
Special Needs Trust (essentially a transferee of the Knudsons) is through
the equitable remedy of the constructive trust.2 40 By suing the Knudsons
instead, Great-West had a remedy at law, whether we call it damages pur24 1
suant to breach of contract or legal restitution.
This raises the question whether the outcome would have been different if the funds from the settlement with the tort defendants had gone
directly to Janette Knudson, rather than to the Special Needs Trust set up
for her care. According to the majority's emphasis on whether a defendant has possession of the plaintiff's property, it would seem that a claim
by Great-West against the Knudsons (in possession of the settlement
funds) would be one for the equitable remedy of constructive trust. In
this situation as well, however, the constructive trust does not apply simply because the defendant has possession of a fund that the plaintiff
claims belongs to it. Rather, the remedy at law-money-is adequate.
One might wonder what Congress intends when it restricts relief to
"equitable" remedies in section 502(a)(3) and in other statutes, but that is
a question that is beyond the scope of this article. As the facts of GreatWest indicate, limiting a plaintiff's cause of action to "equitable relief"
can make a significant difference on the viability of the cause of action,
depending on whom the plaintiff sues. Ironically, the procedural history
of the case reveals that Great-West unsuccessfully tried to amend its complaint to add the trustee of the Special Needs Trust as a defendant once
237. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 225 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] opinion
surely contemplates that a constructive trust claim would lie; hence, the outcome of this
case would be different if Great-West had sued the trustee of the Special Needs Trust, who
has "possession" of the requested funds, instead of the Knudsons, who do not").

238. Id. at 226.

239. Id.
240. See supra notes 118-20, 134-40 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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the state court approved that settlement funds be paid into the trust.242

Congress may not have intended that monetary remedies under ERISA be so tied to procedural intricacies, but its limitation of relief to "equitable" remedies necessitates court interpretation of what that language
means. The majority in Great-West suggested that Congress employed
the phrase "equitable relief" in juxtaposition to legal relief, and that historical practice should guide the differentiation between legal and equitable remedies. 243 Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority's historical
approach. She asserted that because law and equity merged into "one
form of action" with the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
it was wrong to rely on premerger jurisdictional boundaries in interpreting a later-enacted statute. 244 Quoting Mertens, she suggested that a better way to interpret congressional provision for "equitable relief" is to
inquire into the "substance of the relief requested and ask whether relief
of that character was 'typically available in equity." 245 Although Ginsburg acknowledged that restitution was "also available in cases brought
at law,"'246 she asserted that restitution met the "typically available in eq-

uity" standard. 247 Justice Ginsburg could have made her point by citing
instances of restitution afforded in equity courts. Instead, she stated that
"our cases have invariably described restitutionary relief as 'equitable,"248 and she cited Mertens and some right to jury trial cases that described restitution unqualifiedly as equitable. 249 She also cited Mitchell in
support, which, as we have seen, is misread for the broad proposition that
restitution is equitable. 2 50 Justice Ginsburg argued that reading section
242. Great-West named the Knudsons as defendants before the Special Needs Trust
had been approved. Once the state court approved that the settlement funds be paid into
the Special Needs Trust, Great-West moved for leave to amend its complaint to add the
trustee as a defendant. The federal court denied the motion without consideration in light
of its judgment for the Knudsons on the merits. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 226-27 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 218 ("Respecting Congress's choice to limit the relief available under
§ 502(a)(3) to 'equitable relief' requires us to recognize the difference between legal and
equitable forms of restitution."). As we have seen, the majority did not read historical
practice correctly.
244. Id. at 225. Justice Ginsburg noted, however, that reference to historical practice
might be warranted to preserve rights established before the merger of law and equity. Id.
The prime example is the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, which extends only to
suits at common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
245. Id. at 228.
246. Id. (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256). Justice Scalia,
author of the majority opinion in Mertens, attempted to distinguish the quoted Mertens
language in Great-West, stating what was intended was "'that restitution, in contrast to
damages, is a remedy commonly ordered in equity cases and therefore an equitable remedy in a sense in which damages, though occasionally awarded in equity cases, are not."'
Id. at 234 (quoting Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)).
247. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 234.
248. Id.
249. Id. Among the other cases Justice Ginsburg cited for the proposition that restitution is equitable are two right to jury trial cases, Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)
and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), both
discussed infra notes 259-89 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
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502(a)(3) as authorizing restitution would not mean that "equitable resuch a reading would
lief" under the statute meant "all relief" because
2 51
exclude compensatory and punitive damages.
I do not make a choice here as to which of the two approaches is ap2 52
propriate for interpreting the statutory language "equitable relief.1
Rather, I suggest that if restitution is employed to give content to the
phrase "equitable relief"-an approach that I question in Part IV-then
the legal or equitable classification of the restitutionary remedy should be
made in a careful manner. It was a mistake in Mertens for the majority to
state that restitution is a "remedy typically viewed as 'equitable."' Justice
Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Mertens, had to backtrack on
that statement in Great-West. Justice Ginsburg compounded the confusion about restitution by citing cases that carelessly asserted that restitution is an equitable remedy. Some of the cases she referenced in GreatWest involved the right to jury trial, the topic of the next section.
B.

THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

In decisions involving the constitutional right to jury trial, the Supreme
Court has discussed restitution as a means to determining whether the
remedy sought was legal or equitable. Under the Seventh Amendment,
25 3
legal, but not equitable, remedies trigger an entitlement to jury trial.

The Supreme Court has held that a remedy is legal if it is identical or
analogous to remedies available in English common law courts before the
adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791.254 Moreover, the Supreme

Court has indicated that for purposes of construing the right to jury trial,
the historical equitable clean-up doctrine does not apply-if a case involves requests for both injunctive and legal relief, a court may not deny
the right to jury trial on the legal claim by stating that the legal remedy is
incidental to the request for an injunction. 255 Thus, unlike the ambiguities that might be present in construing what "equitable relief" means in a
statute, the difference between legal and equitable remedies for Seventh
251. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 233-34 (noting that compensatory and punitive damages,
"'though occasionally awarded in equity' under the 'clean up doctrine' ... were not typically available in such courts") (citations omitted).
252. Regarding the different meanings the Supreme Court gave the statutory phrase
"equitable relief" in Mertens and Great-West, Professor Laycock has stated that "[p]erhaps
the proper lesson from Mertens and Great-West is that courts and legislatures should quit
using law and equity as doctrinal and statutory categories." LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 8.
253. When a statutory or common law action is deemed to afford a legal as opposed to
an equitable remedy, the litigants have a constitutional entitlement to a jury trial in federal
court. See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-74 (stating that a request for legal relief confers an
entitlement to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment).
254. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998)
(noting that the Seventh Amendment applies to modern statutory rights and remedies that
are analogous to rights and remedies tried in eighteenth-century English common law
courts).
255. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 196 n.l (1994); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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Amendment purposes is based on the historical divide between law and
equity courts.
In Curtis v. Loether,256 the Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant had a right to jury trial where the plaintiff sought an injunction and
compensatory and punitive damages under the fair housing provisions of
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.257 The Court held that the
request for compensatory and punitive damages triggered a right to jury
trial because the monetary relief sought was legal. The Court compared
the damages in Curtis to the remedies of reinstatement and backpay authorized under the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII.
While refusing to express any view on whether backpay under Title VII is
equitable or legal relief, the Supreme Court noted that the courts of appeals had "characterized backpay as an integral part of an equitable rem2 58
edy, a form of restitution.
In Tull v. United States, 259 the Supreme Court contrasted restitution
with civil penalties. The federal government sought massive civil penalties and an injunction against the defendant for violations of the Clean
Water Act. The Court stated that civil penalties, because of their punitive
260
character, were the type of remedy available only in courts of law. 261
Thus, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of liability.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court mischaracterized restitutionary
relief.
The Court summarized the Government's position as suggesting that "a
suit enforcing civil penalties under the Clean Water Act is similar to an
action for disgorgement of improper profits, traditionally considered an
equitable remedy. '262 It is unclear from this language whether the Supreme Court itself considered disgorgement to be an equitable remedy or
whether it was simply characterizing the Government's argument. However, elsewhere in the opinion, the Court labeled disgorgement of profits
as equitable relief, stating that the calculation of civil penalties under the
statute was not to be made "solely on the basis of equitable determinations, such as the profits gained from violations. '263 It did not explain the
basis for its characterization of disgorgement of profits as equitable. The
the proposition that disgorgement of profits
Court has since cited Tull for 264
and restitution are equitable.
256. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000).

258. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
259. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
260. Id. at 422-23.
261. Id. The Supreme Court found, however, that the Seventh Amendment did not
guarantee jury determination of the amount of civil penalties. Id. at 425-27.
262. Id. at 424.
263. Id. at 422.
264. See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 ("we have characterized damages as equitable
where they are restitutionary, such as in 'action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits'")
(quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,
341 (1998); see also Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 ("restitution 'traditionally considered an
equitable remedy"') (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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"Disgorgement" is just another term for the concept that the defendant

must yield up gains that it cannot justly retain. 265 As discussed earlier,
obtaining the defendant's gains could be accomplished both at law and
equity, depending on the circumstances of the case. 266 Thus, the unquali-

fied characterization of disgorgement of profits as an equitable remedy is
misleading.
The Court in Tull rejected the analogy of civil penalties to disgorge-

ment and restitution, quoting Porter for the proposition that
"[r]estitution is limited to 'restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant." 267 Because the civil penalties at issue were not limited to restoration of the

status quo, the Court concluded that they could not be considered restitutionary. 268 In both Porterand Tull, the Court contrasted statutory penal-

ties with restitution, and a definition of restitution as restoring the status
quo and returning the plaintiff to its rightful position was arguably a helpful basis on which to distinguish the two types of remedies. Some lower
courts, however, have taken the definition of restitution in Porterand Tull

out of context and used it as a basis for distinguishing restitution from
damages or compensation. 269 This is erroneous, for while statutory pen-

alties may not have as their purpose restoring the status quo and returning the plaintiff to its rightful position, compensatory damages most
265. See SCHOENBROD, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, supra note 116, at 727
("[Riestitution aims at the defendant's [rightful position]. Disgorgement is the key concept. By making the defendant disgorge the benefits he cannot justly retain, the law of
restitution returns the defendant to the position he should, 'in equity and good conscience,'
have occupied."').
266. See supra notes 109-40 and accompanying text. Cf. 1 PALMER, supra note 31,
§ 2.12 at 160 (stating that "when the case is within the reach of quasi contract, and recovery
of profits does not require the use of techniques available only in equity, we should discard
the notion that profits are recoverable only in equity" and noting that "[t]here is ambiguity
•..

in the term 'profits'").

267. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Babich v. Unisys, No. 92-1473-MLB, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4744, at *2436 (D. Kan. 1994) (citing Tull definition of restitution and stating that if damages were
assessed in the case, those damages "would not serve to compensate plaintiff for a harm
inflicted on him" by the defendant but would "simply restore plaintiff to his rightful position-the essence of restitution") (citation omitted); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, 819
F. Supp. 1296, 1308 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing Tull definition and holding that "[r]eceipt of withheld benefits constitutes relief that is restitutionary and equitable in nature" and therefore
plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial); Pegg v. Gen. Motors, 793 F. Supp. 284 (D. Kan.
1992) (citing Tull definition and holding that backpay is restitutionary and equitable and
therefore that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial); United States v. S.C. Recycling &
Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984, 1007 n.2 (D.S.C. 1985) (citing Porter definition of restitution
and stating that the relief requested under CERCLA was not damages but "equitable restitution-a remedy designed to return plaintiffs to the financial position they were in before
incurring cleanup costs"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., No. 4-80-469, 1983
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15986, at *10-13 (D. Minn. 1983) (citing Porter definition of restitution
and classifying the remedy requested under CERCLA as restitution, not damages, because
"the monetary relief requested by the government is only that amount necessary to compensate it for amounts expended ... in other words, the amount necessary to return the
United States to the status quo ante").
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certainly do.2 70

In Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry,271 the
Court stated that restitutionary remedies are equitable as opposed to legal. 272 The question presented in Terry was whether employees had a
right to jury trial on a claim against their union for breach of the duty of
fair representation. The employees sought monetary relief measured by
the wages and benefits they would have received from the employer had
the union processed their grievances properly.2 73 The Supreme Court
characterized this relief as "compensatory damages representing backpay
and benefits," 274 and concluded that the employees were entitled to a
jury trial because they sought legal relief. The Court correctly deemed
the plaintiffs' requested relief to be compensatory damages because the
employees were seeking to have the Union "make good" the lost wages
they did not receive from the employer.
Rather than simply explain why the relief sought was compensation,
the Court digressed into a discussion of restitution. It asserted that the
relief requested by the employees was not restitution because the employees were not seeking "money wrongfully held by the Union. '2 75 Defining restitution in terms of whether the plaintiff seeks money
"wrongfully held" by the defendant is overbroad. Such a definition
would convert even claims for unpaid debts into restitution.
Terry is problematic in other ways. It characterized as restitutionary
the backpay sought from the employer in Mitchell, but it did not explain
this characterization. 276 Although Curtis simply reported that lower
courts had deemed backpay to be restitution, Terry cited Curtis as support for the assertion that "the Court has noted that backpay sought from
an employer under Title VII would generally be restitutionary in nature. ' 277 Terry also stated that "Congress specifically characterized
270. Cf In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D. Mass.
1989) ("Were the Court to accept the argument that a monetary award is restitutionary
simply because it returns a party to pre-injury status, little would be left in the realm of
compensatory damages.")
271. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
272. Id.
273. The employees also sued the employer for breaching the collective-bargaining
agreement in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act. The employer subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the employees' claim against it was dismissed. Id. at 56163.
274. Id. at 570.
275. Id. at 570-71.
276. Id. at 571 (describing holding in Mitchell that court had power to award backpay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act as incidental to its injunctive powers but then asserting
that "backpay in that case was restitutionary"). As discussed, Mitchell turned on the equitable "clean-up" power of the federal courts. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying
text. Mitchell did not use the term "restitution" to describe lost wages for unlawful discharge, but rather spoke of "reimbursement." See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289-92, 295. Mitchell used "restitution" to describe payment for work that had already been done; see id. at
293, a usage that indicates liability based on unjust enrichment.
277. Terry, 494 U.S. at 572.
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backpay under Title VII as a form of 'equitable relief." 278 As I will discuss in the next section, backpay in most instances should not be described as restitution, nor for jury trial purposes should it be considered
equitable.
Beyond mischaracterizing backpay and relief for "money wrongfully
held" as restitution, Terry made an even more troubling pronouncement
that restitutionary remedies are an exception to the "general rule" that
damages are legal relief.279 Specifically, the Court stated that "we have
characterized damages as equitable where they are restitutionary, such as
in 'action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits." 280 For this proposition, the Court cited Tull, which did not itself offer any support for the
unqualified assertion that restitution is equitable. Terry also cited Curtis,
a case that expressly refrained from commenting on the legal or equitable
character of backpay. 281 Finally, Terry cited Porter,a case that does not
support the proposition that restitution is exclusively an equitable remedy. 282 The Court's language in Terry also makes the mistake of defining
"damages" so broadly as to encompass restitution.
Although the Court has not yet directly held that a claim for restitution
falls outside the scope of the Seventh Amendment-Curtis, Tull, and
Terry all involved monetary relief that the Court deemed to be legal-the
language is quite strong in Terry that a restitutionary remedy would not
trigger a right to a jury trial. Several lower federal courts have seized on
the Terry language and denied jury trials when the relief sought was
deemed restitutionary, without investigating whether the restitution was
283
legal or equitable.
A later decision by the Supreme Court could be read as a retreat from
the blanket assertion in Terry that monetary relief is equitable if it is restitutionary. In Wooddell v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Work278. Id. (citing language in Title VII authorizing reinstatement "with or without
backpay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate").
279. Id. at 570.
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 149-68 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Wilson v. Belmont Homes, 970 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Terry for
the proposition that "backpay obviously would be restitutionary" and denying a right to
jury trial in a Title VII case); Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156 (10th
Cir. 1998) (citing Terry and denying right to jury trial in part because the recovery of benefits under a provision of ERISA, 29 USC § 1132(a)(1)(B), is "equitable/restitutionary");
Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., No. 97-374-JM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18398 (1999) (unpublished opinion) (denying a right to jury trial because the plaintiff
sought restitution and citing Terry for the proposition that "[riestitution is a prime example
of a form of monetary relief that courts impose as an equitable remedy"); Broadnax Mills,
Inc. v. Blue Cross, 876 F. Supp. 809, 817 (E.D. Va. 1995) (denying a right to jury trial
because a "substantial portion of the monetary relief sought is for restitution" and citing
Terry for the proposition that where "monetary relief actually seeks restitution ... the
nature of the relief is generally equitable"); Colonial Williamsburg Foun. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 909 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Va. 1995) (following Broadnax and denying jury trial
request under ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) because the plaintiff "seeks purely equitable remedies such as restitution").
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ers,28 4 the Court followed Terry in holding that a suit by employees
against their union for breach of the duty of fair representation is a suit
for compensatory damages. It interpreted Terry as finding that monetary
relief for such a cause of action is not "analogous to equitable restitutionary relief. '2 85 In using the adjective "equitable," the Court in Wooddell
implicitly left open the possibility that certain types of restitutionary relief could trigger the right to jury trial if deemed legal in nature. There is
little indication, however, that lower courts have read Wooddell in such a
286
nuanced fashion.
Tull and Terry, with their unsupported and misleading assertions that
restitution is equitable, have had repercussions beyond the right to jury
trial context. They have surfaced in opinions concerning whether a mon2 87
etary remedy falls within a statutory authorization of equitable relief.
A prime example is Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Great-West, which cites
Tull and Terry in asserting that "our cases have invariably described resti'288
tutionary relief as equitable.
Tull and Terry labeled restitution as equitable without any inquiry into
historical practice. Well-established Supreme Court precedent requires,
however, that the legal or equitable nature of a remedy under the Seventh Amendment must be tied at least by analogy to historical practice as
of 1791. The widely cited statement in Terry that damages are "equitable
where they are restitutionary" was based on careless readings of prior
Court decisions; Tull cited no cases to support its classification of restitution as equitable. If a remedy is classified as restitutionary, the Seventh
Amendment inquiry should not end. There remains a further questionwhether the restitutionary remedy and the claim to which it is associated
would have been brought in a law court or an equity court as of 1791.289
C.

BACKPAY AS AN EXAMPLE OF MISCLASSIFICATION

Having shown how the Supreme Court has mischaracterized restitution, I turn now to an examination of one remedy-backpay-to illustrate how federal courts have applied their understanding of restitution.
We will see that courts have reached conflicting decisions on whether
backpay is damages or restitution and is legal or equitable. Some of the
cases involved whether the applicable statute authorized the plaintiff's
claim for backpay; other cases involved whether a request for backpay
284. 502 U.S. 93 (1991).
285. Id. at 97.
286. A Lexis search on June 23, 2002, found only one federal case that quoted Wooddell's language of "equitable restitutionary relief." See Cellular Dynamics, Inc. v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., No. 94-C-3126, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7466, at *28. The court in Cellular Dynamics found that the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, not restitution, so it did not elaborate on the phrase "equitable restitutionary relief."
287. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1995), discussed infra notes
316-20 and accompanying text; Russell v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 921 F. Supp. 143
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
288. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
289. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
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triggered an entitlement to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. I
suggest that whether one uses a definition of restitution as liability based
on or measured by unjust enrichment or as the yielding up of defendant's
gain at the plaintiff's expense, backpay in most cases should not be con-

sidered restitution.2 9 0 Even if one were to characterize backpay as restitution, the historical divide between law and equity indicates that it is
legal, not equitable.
Let us begin first with treatments of backpay by the Supreme Court. In
addition to the fleeting remark in Terry that backpay is restitutionary and
equitable, the Justices in Great-West briefly discussed backpay. Justice
Ginsburg read Terry and Curtis as recognizing that backpay is a form of
restitution, and she quoted Terry for the proposition that Congress had
characterized backpay as equitable under the employment discrimination
provisions of Title VII.2 91 Moreover, she cited approvingly lower court
cases that suggested that backpay is equitable because it is restitutionary. 292 The majority argued that Congress treated backpay as equitable
under Title VII "only in the narrow sense that it allowed backpay to be
awarded together with equitable relief. '293 This reasoning seems to be
another iteration of the equitable clean-up doctrine-that is, when reinstatement or hiring is ordered, equity can award money as incidental to
the injunction. Yet, the Supreme Court has held that when a claim for
legal relief is joined with a claim for equitable relief, the clean-up doctrine may not result in a denial of a jury trial on the legal claim. 294 Moreover, in cases between Terry and Great-West, the Supreme Court has
expressly stated that it has not yet decided whether backpay under Title
295
VII is legal or equitable for jury trial purposes.
The lower federal courts have split on whether backpay is restitution,
and, if so, whether it is equitable. Many of the decisions have involved
whether a request for backpay under Title VII triggers an entitlement to
jury trial. Title VII authorizes courts to "order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstate290. Possible exceptions are discussed infra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
291. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 230 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Title VII provides in part
that courts may order "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay...
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(2000).
292. Id. at 230 n.2.
293. Id. at 218 n.4.
294. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (asserting that when a claim for
legal relief is joined with a claim for equitable relief, the clean-up doctrine may not result
in a denial of a jury trial on the legal claim); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500 (1959). See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 196 n.11; 2 DOBBS, supra note 31, at 227
(suggesting that Dairy Queen means that when a plaintiff seeks backpay under Title VII, a
jury trial is guaranteed notwithstanding any characterization of the backpay claim as
"merely incidental" to the equitable claim of reinstatement).
295. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 253 n.4 (1994) (noting that the
Court had not yet determined "whether a plaintiff seeking backpay under Title VII is entitled to a jury trial"); Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 549 n.1 (1990) (stating
that the Supreme Court has "not yet ruled on the question of whether a plaintiff seeking
relief under Title VII had a right to a jury trial").
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ment or hiring of employees, with or without backpay ... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 2 96 In enacting Title VII
in 1964, Congress apparently chose the "equitable relief" language to
foreclose the possibility of a jury trial, for fear that juries would be hostile
to employment discrimination plaintiffs. 297 Thus, it is not surprising that
before Terry, most lower courts interpreted backpay under Title VII to be
equitable. 2 98 After Terry, courts have cited the case for the proposition
2 99
that backpay under Title VII is restitutionary and thus equitable.
Outside the Title VII context, several decisions on the right to jury trial
have rejected the notion that backpay is restitutionary and thus equitable. 300 In Waldrop v. Southern Co. Servs.,30 1 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit deemed backpay to be compensatory and accordingly found that a plaintiff who sued for reinstatement and backpay
under the employment discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation
296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized
compensatory and punitive damages for various forms of intentional discrimination, with
caps on awards tied to the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(a)-(b) (2000). Congress
provided that these possible remedies are in addition to those authorized under Title VII.
Id. at § 1981a(a)(1). In limiting the amount of compensatory and punitive damages that
are recoverable, Congress specified that compensatory damages under section 1981a "shall
not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under" the
remedial provisions of Title VII. Id. at § 1981a(b)(2). Although a demand for compensatory or punitive damages will trigger an entitlement to jury trial because such damages are
"legal," the issue remains whether a right to jury trial exists when a plaintiff suing under
Title VII seeks only backpay. This situation might arise when a plaintiff sues an employer
with 14 employees or less, because compensatory and punitive damages are not available
against such an employer under § 1981a. See id. at § 1981a(b)(3).
297. See LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 1117 ("The statutory talk of equitable relief was a deliberate attempt to avoid jury trial, recognized as such
at the time."); Hornsby v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 963 F.2d 1130, 1135 (8th Cir.
1992) (Arnold, J., dissenting) ("Title VII ... appears to be the only exception to the
general rule that backpay is legal relief. Although I cannot see how to justify this anomaly,
the difference in treatment may have resulted from the particular language Congress chose
... ."). Cf. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1974) (noting that with respect to the
fair housing provisions of Title VIII, the legislative history indicates that some members of
Congress "were concerned that the possibility of racial prejudice on juries might reduce
the effectiveness of civil rights damages actions" while other comments indicate "an awareness that jury trials would have to be afforded in damages actions under Title VIII").
298. See, e.g., cases cited 2 DOBBs, supra note 31, at 226-27 nn.10-11. A distinct minority of courts held that backpay under Title VII is compensatory and therefore that there is
a right to jury trial. See, e.g., Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 643-46
(N.D. Ala. 1989): accord Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1990),
rev'd mere., vacated 930 F.2d 924 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 86 (1991); Jenouri
v. WAPA-TV Pegasus Broad., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 118,119 (D.P.R. 1990) (relying on Beesley,
723 F. Supp. 635).
299. See, e.g.,Wilson v. Belmont Homes, 970 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Gilbert & Bennett, No. 95-C-7228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 608 (Jan. 15, 1997) (finding that
backpay is equitable under Title VII and therefore judge determines claim for backpay).
300. See, e.g., Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, 49 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussed
infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text); Waldrop v. S. Co. Servs., 24 F.3d 152 (11 th Cir.
1994) (discussed infra notes 301-04 and accompanying text); Hill v. Winn-Dixie, 934 F.2d
1518 (11th Cir. 1991) (deciding that mandatory backpay under Jury System Improvements
Act is not restitutionary).
301. 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir. 1994).
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Act 302 was entitled to a jury trial. 30 3 The court declared that backpay
under the Act did not fall within the ambit of restitution, reasoning that
the defendant was not unjustly enriched by its termination of the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff would not, by obtaining backpay, receive "restoration in
30 5
kind of a specific thing. '30 4 Similarly, in Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
a plaintiff who sued for instatement and backpay under a "first right of
hire" provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978306 was entitled to
a jury trial. The court asserted that backpay was compensatory rather
than restitutionary. First, it noted that the plaintiff's "recovery would not
'30 7
be measured by any hypothetical gain [the defendant] had enjoyed.
Second, the court stated that backpay is compensatory because any income from alternative employment usually is subtracted from an award
of backpay. 30 8 Although citing the language in Terry that restitutionary
relief is an exception to the general rule that monetary relief is legal,
neither Waldrop nor Crocker attempted to square their conclusions that
backpay is compensatory with the comments in Terry suggesting that
backpay sought from an employer is restitutionary.
Federal courts have examined whether backpay is restitution in contexts other than those involving the right to jury trial. One example
arises under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
waives sovereign immunity in actions against federal agencies as long as
the plaintiff seeks "relief other than money damages. '30 9 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this statutory language to waive sovereign immunity if the plaintiff seeks "specific relief. ' 310 In Hubbard v. Adm'r,
EPA,311 the D.C. Circuit concluded in an en banc opinion that backpay
constitutes "money damages," thus falling outside the APA waiver of sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that an award of backpay "essentially pays the plaintiff for the economic losses suffered as a result of the
employer's wrong; it does not return to the plaintiff anything which was
rightfully his in the first place. '312 The court gave short shrift to the plain302. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002.)
303. 24 F.3d at 158-59.
304. Id.
305. 49 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

306. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 43(d)(1); 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 42103 (1994)), repealed by Workforce Investment Act of 1998, ch. 5, § 199(c)(1), 112 Stat. 936 (1998) (Originally, the Act provided a
furloughed or terminated airline employee, with four years' experience as of October 1978,
a "first right of hire, regardless of age, in his occupational specialty, by any other air carrier
hiring additional employees. .
307. 49 F.3d at 747.
308. Id.
309. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
310. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 895 (1988), discussed supra notes 79, 148.
311. 982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
312. Id. at 534. The court added that a successful plaintiff does not necessarily obtain a
full award of backpay; rather, income from alternative employment typically is deducted
from the gross unpaid income. This underscored for the court that backpay is not specific
relief but rather is damages for the plaintiff's actual losses. Id. at 533-34.
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tiff's argument that backpay is "specific because it is restitutionary," stating that the inquiry under section 702 is not whether the remedy is
restitutionary but whether "it gives the plaintiff the specific thing to
which he was originally entitled. '313 The court continued that the
backpay sought by the plaintiff was not restitutionary, stating: "Giving
back pay to [the plaintiff] would return to him the 'value' of the job from
which he was wrongfully excluded and is thus compensatory damages, not
'314
'in kind' restitution.
Although Hubbard determined that backpay is not restitution, other
federal appellate courts have described backpay as restitution in reaching
the conclusion that backpay is equitable relief authorized by ERISA
§ 502(a)(3). 3 15 In Schwartz v. Gregori,31 6 the Sixth Circuit relied on the
language in Terry that backpay from an employer is restitutionary, but it
noted that Terry had not itself explained this characterization. 3 17 To buttress its classification of backpay as restitution, Schwartz suggested that
neither unjust enrichment nor in kind restoration is required for a remedy
to be considered restitutionary; rather, what is essential is that the remedy "operates to restore to the plaintiff that to which she would have
enjoyed but for the employer's illegal retaliation. ' 318 By applying a definition of restitution as "restoration" of a plaintiff's loss, the opinion in
Schwartz falls into the trap of obliterating any distinction between restitution and damages. 319 Having classified the backpay remedy as restitution, Schwartz then cited the Mertens language (since qualified in GreatWest) that restitution is a remedy typically available in equity and thus
320
within section 502(a)(3).
Scholarly commentary has divided over whether backpay is damages or
restitution, and, if restitution, whether it is legal or equitable. For example, an earlier version of Moore's Federal Practice & Procedure commented that backpay should be considered equitable because it
constitutes "restitution to the employee of the wages which he would
313. Id. at 538.
314. Id. at 539 n.12 (citing Laycock, The Scope & Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 1217, 1279 (1989)).
315. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1995); Russell v. Northrop
Grumman Corp., 921 F. Supp. 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
316. 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Russell v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 921 F.
Supp. 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (following Schwartz in concluding that backpay is restitutionary
and thus equitable under § 502(a)(3)).
317. 45 F.3d at 1022.

318. Id. The court stated:
While restitution generally is awarded to prevent unjust enrichment to the
defendant, this is not required in every case . . . . Nor is it necessary that
restitution be made in kind, for a court may restore the plaintiff to the position he formerly occupied "either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money."
Id.
319. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
320. 45 F.3d at 1022-23.
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have earned except for the employer's violation" of law. 32 1 Professor
Dobbs, on the other hand, asserts that a claim for backpay is a legal claim
for damages, which does "not differ remedially from the personal injury
claim for lost wages, or the contract claim for past wages due. '322 He
rejects the assertion that backpay is equitable because it is restitutionary
as "doubly wrong, since a claim does not become equitable by being restitutionary and since backpay does not seem to fit the restitutionary cate323
gory in any event.
The main problem with defining backpay as restitution is that the defendant generally will not have received a benefit at the plaintiff's expense. Such a benefit is an essential element of restitution, whether we
define restitution as liability based on or measured by unjust enrichment
or as a remedy based on the defendant's gain at the plaintiff's expense.
The employer can be said to have saved the plaintiff's wages after discharge, but the employer will not have received any work from the plaintiff.324 The backpay remedy is more appropriately characterized as
damages for the plaintiff's losses and thus legal relief.
Situations exist, however, in which a defendant might be viewed as having gained a benefit at the employee's expense-for example, when a defendant discharges an employee to foreclose the employee's receipt of
321. 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.24[2] (2d ed.
1988). The treatise offered two alternative explanations for why a statutory action for
employment and backpay "involves only equitable remedies" and thus should not trigger
the right to jury trial: The action may be "regarded as a suit for specific performance of an
employment contract, with the re-employment features supplied by the Act, and incidental
damages" or "as an action to enjoin continued violation of the Act and for restitution to
the employee of the wages which he would have earned except for the employer's violation
of the Act." Id.
322. 2 DOBBS, supra note 31, at 226.
323. Id. at 227. In rejecting the notion that restitution is equitable, Dobbs comments:
Restitution claims at law include all the quasi-contract claims based on assumpsit, such as those based on common counts like money had and received
and quantum meruit ...Restitutionary claims many others may be equitable
in the sense that they appeal to the judge's sense of justice or fairness or
discretion, but not equitable in the jurisdictional sense that they could have
been brought in an equity court and tried without a jury.
Id. at 227 n.14. In asserting that backpay is not restitutionary, he continues:
Backpay is an element of compensation of the plaintiff, a traditional function
of damages at law. As already indicated, the comparison is in fact to the
claim for lost wages in personal injury actions. Backpay might be considered
restitutionary if it were measured by the defendant's gain rather than the
plaintiff's loss, that is, if it were aimed at preventing unjust enrichment. But
that is not the case; it is aimed at compensation and measured by the plaintiff's loss. Indeed, in most cases one would be required to depart substantially from legal tradition to find any unjust enrichment on the part of a
discriminatory defendant who discharges A but must hire B at the same
costs.
Id. at 227-28 n.15. See also Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional
Compromise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1, 38 (1995) (asserting that "few analytically coherent arguments exist in favor of designating backpay as anything other than compensatory relief").
324. See

LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES,

supra note 21, at 1117 ("[T]he es-

sential element of a restitution claim is missing: plaintiff performed no work, so the employer got no benefit and is not unjustly enriched."). Of note is that Laycock's discussion
of backpay does not refer to the concept of "specific restitution."
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retirement benefits or when the employee worked but was underpaid. 32 5
In these circumstances, we might say that backpay can be considered either damages or restitution. Even if a backpay remedy is deemed restitution, however, there remains the question whether it is legal or equitable.
If we have a situation in which backpay is appropriately called restitution, the legal or equitable characterization of the remedy may depend on
the necessity of the characterization. If the court is determining whether
a right to jury trial exists, then the historical divide between law and equity courts will govern. Recall that most restitutionary claims for money
were asserted in the law courts. 326 With the example of the employee
discharged so as to foreclose the employee's receipt of retirement benefits, the remedy at law is adequate. There is no need for "tracing" the
plaintiff's money and thus no need for an equitable remedy. The possible
exception to this would be an instance of defendant insolvency; in such a
situation, the plaintiff could claim need of the equitable remedy of a constructive trust.
A court may determine that a particular request for backpay is appropriately classified as restitution, and face the further question whether the
remedy falls within a statutory provision authorizing only "equitable relief." In this circumstance, the method of statutory interpretation used
may well make the difference. If the historical division between law and
equity is to be the guide, then a restitutionary remedy for money in most
circumstances would be legal. Under the equitable clean-up doctrine,
however, backpay could be considered within a court of equity's jurisdiction as a remedy incidental to reinstatement. Note that the application of
the equitable clean-up doctrine does not depend on labeling backpay to
be restitution or equitable. The doctrine can be applicable to even damages awards that are considered "incidental" to an injunction. 32 7 Techniques of statutory interpretation other than historical reference might
lead to different conclusions as to whether "equitable relief" includes
backpay.
The cases discussed in this Part-involving whether the plaintiff stated
a claim for relief permissible under a statute and whether the litigants had
a right to jury trial-expose the consequences of applying imprecise definitions of restitution to the classification of monetary remedies. In the
context of interpreting statutes, mistakes about restitution have contributed to contorted Supreme Court opinions and further confusion in the
lower courts. In the context of determining whether a right to jury trial
exists, expansive and inaccurate definitions of restitution have led courts
32 8
to deny the constitutional right to jury trial.
325. See 2 Dow3s, supra note 31, at 227 n.15.
326. See supra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 125, 149-68 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 283, 299 and accompanying text; see also Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers' Intl. v. Amoco Corp., No. 93-C-5929, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14391 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (denying right to jury trial by characterizing the plaintiffs' requested remedy as resti-

2002]

MISCLASSIFYING MONETARY RESTITUTION

1635

IV. CLEARING UP THE CONFUSION OVER
MONETARY RESTITUTION
With the muddled manner in which courts have treated the classification of monetary restitution, it is worth exploring possible sources of the
confusion. One simple explanation is that lawyers and judges are unfamiliar with the law of restitution in general. Restitution as a separate
course was dropped in the mid-1960's from the curriculum of U.S. law
schools; many lawyers, law clerks, and judges today thus have little
grounding in the topic. 329 With the resurgence of scholarly interest in
restitution and with the forthcoming publication of a new Restatement,
one may hope that lawyers and judges will gain greater understanding of
the subject. Another explanation for court mistakes about monetary restitution is the inexact application of precedent. This article has identified
how language about monetary restitution in Supreme Court decisions was
330
misread in later cases by both the Court and lower federal courts.
In addition to these explanations, much of the incoherent treatment of
monetary restitution can be traced to the courts' use of restitution to distinguish between law and equity and to define the equitable powers of
federal courts. Employing restitution in this manner causes needless
complexity and generally does not help answer the ultimate questions involved. Restitution has been used to solve problems for which it is illsuited, and the frequent result is mischaracterization of monetary
remedies.
The American Law Institute, with its effort to produce a Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, has an opportunity to clarify for lawyers and judges the differences between monetary restitution
and damages and between legal and equitable restitution. After suggesting in this Part that courts should not use restitution to differentiate
between legal and equitable relief, I will make recommendations for how
the new Restatement might contribute to greater understanding of the
classification issues surrounding monetary restitution.
A.

THE MISUSE OF RESTITUTION TO ADDRESS THE LAW/EQUiTY
DIVIDE AND THE EQUITABLE POWERS OF FEDERAL COURTS

The modern Supreme Court has been engaged in a far-reaching debate
over how to interpret statutory authorizations of equitable relief and,
331
more generally, how to define the equitable powers of federal courts.
One manifestation of this debate appears in Mertens, with the Scalia
opinion for a majority of five interpreting the statutory language "other
appropriate equitable relief" under ERISA section 502(a)(3) to mean retution because plaintiffs "demand the return of that which, under the Plan, allegedly belongs to them" and stating, "[c]onsequently, Plaintiffs seek equitable relief").
329. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Part III.
331. See, e.g., Great-West v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Grupo Mexicano v. Alliance
Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).

1636

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

lief "typically available in equity," but the dissent reading the statutory
language more broadly to mean remedies historically available in courts
of equity for breach of trust, which would include a variety of remedies. 332 In Grupo Mexicano v. Alliance Bond Fund,3 33 a 1999 case deciding whether a federal court may issue a preliminary injunction preventing
a defendant from disposing of its assets, the Supreme Court split over the
power of federal courts to fashion equitable remedies that were not historically available. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, asserted that the federal
courts' equitable powers are defined by the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act
of 1789. 334 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, dissented, criticizing the "static conception of equity jurisdiction"
adopted by the majority and arguing for a more flexible interpretation of
the federal courts' equitable powers. 335 In Great-West, the same line-up
of Justices as in Grupo Mexicano divided over the meaning of the Mertens "typically available in equity"
standard for interpreting a statutory
336
authorization of equitable relief.
It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the Supreme Court's
debate about how to define equitable remedies and the federal courts'
equitable powers. 337 Moreover, I do not attempt here to suggest general
guidelines for discerning whether a monetary remedy is legal or equitable
for purposes of interpreting a statutory authorization of equitable relief
or of determining whether a litigant has a right to jury trial. These important and difficult questions are left for future discussion.
Rather, what this article shows is that the Supreme Court has often
needlessly or improperly used restitution in trying to solve broader questions about the law/equity divide and the remedial powers of the federal
courts. I suggest that using restitution to differentiate legal from equitable monetary remedies is complicated and generally unhelpful. First,
there is the tough question of whether to call the monetary remedy restitution or something else. We have seen how scholars and courts have
used varying definitions of restitution. I have argued that the concept of
"specific restitution" generally does not apply to a loss of money, but
there remains the question whether a remedy should be called restitution
only when liability is based on unjust enrichment or whenever the remedy
332. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
333. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
334. Id. at 318-19.
335. Id. at 335-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
336. Professor Laycock has commented that in Great-West, "the four moderates voted
for the corporate plaintiff, and the five conservatives for the injured employee spousethey had turned it into another ideological battle about the scope of federal equity." LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 21, at 1116-17.
337. For an argument that Grupo Mexicano "rewrote the history of remedies in equity," see Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on FederalJudicial Power-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000).
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is based on the defendant's gain rather than the plaintiff's loss. It makes
little sense to have courts grapple with this uncertain definitional problem

when the ultimate question is not whether the monetary remedy is restitution or something else but whether the remedy is legal or equitable.
Second, even if courts could achieve some certainty and consistency
about when a monetary remedy is restitution, labeling a particular monetary remedy as restitution has no direct impact on the decision whether

the remedy is legal or equitable. 338 With respect to the right to jury trial,
there must be inquiry into whether the remedy was the type that law
courts or equity courts would have entertained as of 1791. Typically,
plaintiff requests for money were heard in the courts of law, whether they
were requests for damages or requests for restitution. 339 The relatively
rare restitution claims for money handled by equity (that did not involve
fiduciary relationships or insolvent defendants) were those in which the
plaintiff needed to trace its money or property. 340 Rather than addressing whether the plaintiff seeks restitution or damages, one could go directly to the question whether the remedy sought requires equitable

tracing. 34 1 That is, in determining whether a remedy is legal or equitable
for jury trial purposes, it is not as important that the constructive trust
and the equitable lien are considered restitutionary remedies as that they
342
are remedies that equity courts developed.
With respect to a statutory authorization of "equitable relief," labeling
the remedy as restitution is beside the point because ultimately, the question comes down to how courts interpret the meaning of "equitable relief." In Great-West, the Justices might have focused directly on whether
the remedy fell within the statutory authorization of equitable relief. Instead, the Justices meandered into a debate about whether the remedy
338. The facts of Great-West are illustrative. The majority and dissent assumed that the
remedy requested was restitution, but they argued over whether the remedy was legal or
equitable.
339. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text. As discussed, Terry erred in stating
that damages are "equitable where they are restitutionary."
340. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
341. The term "equitable tracing" is used here to recognize that although U.S. authorities have considered tracing to be available only in equity, see supra note 138 and accompanying text, at least two English decisions reported before adoption of the Seventh
Amendment recognized simple forms of tracing at law. See Scott v. Surman, Willes 400,
125 Eng. Rep. 1235 (1742) (cited in 1 PALMER, supra note 31 § 2.14 at 177 n.11); Golightly
v. Reynolds, (1772) Lofft. 88 (referenced in GOFF & JONES, supra note 30 at 100). A prior
edition of GOFF & JONES characterizes Golightly as establishing "the common law right to

follow property into its product."

ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITU-

45 (1966). If determination of a right to jury trial in a given case turns on the need for
tracing, current Seventh Amendment doctrine seemingly would require an inquiry into
whether the type of tracing at issue would have been available at law or in equity in lateeighteenth century England.
342. Although this is a possible way to interpret the Seventh Amendment, the scope of
which is tied to practices in 1791, it might not be an appropriate tool for interpreting what a
modern-day Congress intended in authorizing only "equitable relief." Using this method
would mean that a monetary remedy under the statute would be available if the plaintiff
needs tracing, but not necessarily if the plaintiff can sue at law for the money. This raises
the question whether the statutory right to a remedy should turn on such a technicality.
TION
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was legal restitution or equitable restitution, a debate that was riddled
343
with errors.
In sum, courts often are faced with difficult problems of deciding
whether a plaintiff's request for money falls within a statutory scheme
authorizing equitable relief or is legal or equitable for right to jury trial
purposes. A coherent approach to such problems is needed. Using restitution, however, is not an answer. At best, inquiring into whether the
remedy is restitution does not get us very far, and at worst, it is a distraction that courts too often get wrong.
B.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE

NEW

RESTATEMENT

The American Law Institute should take the opportunity with its new
Restatement to illuminate the classification of monetary restitution. Most
fundamentally, it would be helpful if the ALl used an unambiguous definition of restitution that would be consistently applied throughout the
new Restatement. Whether this can be achieved is questionable, however,
given the scholarly debate over whether restitution is solely the law of
unjust enrichment or something more. The ALI drafts circulated thus far
and the very title of the new Restatement, referring both to "Restitution"
and "Unjust Enrichment," suggest some ambiguity in how restitution will
344
be defined.
Even if the definitional debate is not resolved in the new Restatement,
some lesser steps could be taken that would advance understanding about
the classification of monetary restitution. First, the Restatement should
differentiate monetary restitution from compensation or damages, with
monetary restitution reserved for relief measured by the defendant's gain
and compensation or damages reserved for relief measured by the plaintiff's loss. This distinction could be drawn explicitly in Section 48, which
345
will be devoted to "Monetary Relief" as a remedy in restitution.
Moreover, as discussed earlier in this Article, the current drafts contain
some language using "compensation" to describe the remedy for unjust
34 6
enrichment; this usage should be avoided.
Second, to minimize confusion about the distinction between monetary
restitution and damages, the Restatement should make clear that the concept of specific restitution does not apply to a loss of money. 347 The best
place to make this point would be Section 55 of the new Restatement,
343. Although the majority and dissent made mistakes in Great-West about restitution,
the majority at least recognized that restitution has roots in both law and equity, correcting
the impression left in prior decisions that restitution is solely equitable.
344. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
345. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJusr ENRICHMENT, projected
overall table of contents at xxii (Discussion Draft, March 31, 2000). Chapter 6 in the Projected Overall Table of Contents is titled "Remedies in Restitution" and includes separate
sections on "reformation," "monetary relief," and "proprietary rights." Id.
346. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
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devoted to "Specific Restitution. ' 348 An assertion that specific restitution should not describe a monetary award for a loss of money should be
accompanied by a notation that a monetary
award nonetheless might be
34 9
appropriately considered "specific relief.

Third, the Restatement should stress that monetary restitution has roots
in both law and equity. The current Discussion Draft reserves section 1,
comment f for discussion of the point that restitution is "an amalgam of
legal and equitable elements" that "can be historically distinguished if
need be." 350 Such a discussion will be an important and necessary contribution to the understanding of restitution in general. Because of the propensity of courts to label monetary restitution as equitable, however, the
Restatement should address specifically the problem of classifying monetary awards. Either in comment f or in a comment to Section 48 on monetary relief, the Restatement should remark that monetary restitution
historically was available at both law and equity, with most claims for
monetary restitution asserted in the law courts. 351 A statement to this
effect should be accompanied by some acknowledgement that considerations other than historical practice might have a role to play in deciding
whether a monetary remedy-be it restitution or something else-is la352
beled legal or equitable.
With these suggested clarifications, the new Restatement could contribute significantly to greater understanding about how to classify monetary
restitution. Hopefully, lawyers, judges, and Congress will also begin to
recognize the distinctions between monetary restitution and damages and
between legal and equitable restitution.
348. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, projected
overall table of contents at xxii (Discussion Draft, March 31, 2000). Section 55 on Specific
Restitution is placed in Chapter 8, "Rights in Identifiable Property." Id. It remains to be
seen whether the Restatement (Third) will discuss specific restitution only as related to
liability based on unjust enrichment or whether it will treat specific restitution as a remedy
that restores something specific to the plaintiff, regardless of the basis of liability. See
supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. The question of rights to an identifiable fund of
money held by an insolvent debtor-which Laycock draws within the rubric of "specific
restitution"-apparently will be addressed in Section 60 ("Restitution in Bankruptcy") and
Section 64 ("Competing Claimants"). RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, at xxiii (Discussion
Draft, March 31, 2000).
349. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, projected
overall table of contents at xxii (Discussion Draft, March 31, 2000). Section 55 on Specific
Restitution is placed in Chapter 8, "Rights in Identifiable Property." Id. It remains to be
seen whether the Restatement (Third) will discuss specific restitution only as related to
liability based on unjust enrichment or whether it will treat specific restitution as a remedy
that restores something specific to the plaintiff, regardless of the basis of liability. See
supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. The question of rights to an identifiable fund of
money held by an insolvent debtor-which Laycock draws within the rubric of "specific

restitution"-apparently will be addressed in Section 60 ("Restitution in Bankruptcy") and
Section 64 ("Competing Claimants"). RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, at xxiii (Discussion

Draft, March 31, 2000).
350. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
10 (Discussion Draft, March 31, 2000).
351.

AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, §

See supra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.

352. See supra Part IV.A.
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CONCLUSION
Courts at times have misclassified monetary remedies as restitution
when they should have been characterized as damages. This misclassification is often a product of imprecise assertions that restitution restores
the plaintiff to its rightful position or restores the status quo. Moreover,
courts frequently have ignored or misunderstood the differences between
legal and equitable restitution, mistakenly characterizing restitution as
exclusively equitable. These mistakes of classification often have occurred in cases in which the ultimate question was whether the plaintiff
sought legal or equitable relief.
To avoid future confusion and mistakes, courts should not employ the
terminology of restitution as a path to distinguishing between legal and
equitable monetary relief. To the extent that courts continue to characterize certain monetary remedies as restitution in an effort to discern
whether the remedies are legal or equitable, they should respect the differences between restitution at law and restitution in equity.

